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Abstract      
 
 
The goal of this Master´s thesis is to compare and understand different types of hedge fund strategies, 
the risks, and returns included within hedge funds, and how hedge funds can be benchmarked against 
the market returns. In addition to this, the performance of hedge funds during crises is evaluated. The 
main risks that this thesis addresses regarding the hedge funds industry are systematic risks, credit 
risks, tail risks, liquidity risks, and other risks embedded within the hedge fund industry. Several main 
crisis periods are defined in this study, namely the crises of 1998, 2001, 2008, and 2020 and the 
overall time period included in this thesis is between January 1997 and November 2020. 
 
Hedge funds are described as alternative investment methods. What makes them alternative compared 
to traditional investment methods (such as investing in stocks and traditional funds) is the ability to 
follow and apply unconventional trading strategies such as futures, swaps, options and, arbitrage. One 
particular trait of hedge funds is the ability to reach different types and levels of risks through various 
exposures to markets, combined with different betas and alphas. The principal data employed in this 
thesis is obtained from BarclayHedge and the model applied to study the return movements of hedge 
fund strategies against the market returns is the capital asset pricing model. Main research questions 
within this thesis pursue to answer a) whether overall hedge fund performance is market neutral and 
positive even during the periods of financial turmoil, b) whether hedge funds are able to capture 
excess alpha and differentiated beta exposures during financial crises, c) furthermore, this thesis 
pursues to answer questions concerning genuine risks affecting hedge funds´ ability to create value 
and gain profits. 
 
The results indicate that when compared to normal time periods, most hedge fund strategies are in fact 
not able to create statistically significant excess alpha during several financial crises. Furthermore, 
even though measurements of hedge fund neutrality such as beta coefficients and correlation are 
seemingly small during times of market tranquillity, values increase promptly during financial crises. 
Therefore, questioning the neutrality of hedge fund strategies and the actual level of hedging during 
financial crises is in place. 
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What makes the hedge fund industry so intriguing to me that I would choose to write 
a thesis about this topic? As I wrote my bachelor´s thesis about stock-portfolio 
diversification and the risk tolerance that affects the investors desire to invest and 
diversify, I thought that pursuing a master´s thesis about more industrial and complex 
investing strategies would give me a more comprehensive outlook on the whole 
investments industry. Hedge funds have also gained a lot of attractivity in the past two 
decades and extensive studies about this topic are increasingly more common. Bali, 
Gokcan, and Liang (2007) point out that the astounding recent popularity gained by 
hedge funds is mainly due to the low correlations with traditional asset classes such as 
mutual funds, a light regulation, flexible trading strategies, and an advantageous fee 
structure. 
The implication within the term “hedging” is the reduction of risk, hence the term 
“hedge against risk”. Risks faced by an investor could be those related to inflation, or 
fluctuations of stock markets, oil price or for instance foreign exchange rates. A 
perfectly hedged situation implies the outcome of not risk at all. (Hull, 2018, p. 49). A 
perfectly hedged situation can for instance be achieved when an asset or an investment 
object is entirely negatively correlated inside the portfolio and therefore reduces the 
portfolio variance to a minimum (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2014, p. 234). Adrian, 
Brunnermeier, and Nquyen (2011) add in this context that the hedge fund sector has 
become one of the crucial elements of the market-based financial systems, and even 
though during tranquil market conditions hedge funds provide liquidity provisions and 
advanced returns, during times of market turmoil and crises, hedge funds can be forced 
to deliver, which might contribute to the overall market volatility and other poor 
outcomes.  
Hedge funds are well known for their usage of hedging, derivatives, arbitrage, and 
speculation. Similar to mutual funds, hedge funds also invest on behalf of customers 
(Hull, 2018, p. 12). What differentiates them from classical mutual funds is that they 
offer their services only to institutional investors such as endowment funds, pension 
funds, or prosperous individuals, whereas mutual funds also offer their securities in a 
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more public manner (Bodie et al. 2014, p. 13). Mutual funds are also more prone to 
regulations regarding the liquidation of investments, investment policies, and usage of 
leverage that are relatively loosely regulated within hedge funds. Their freedom from 
strict regulations allows hedge funds the independence to employ unconventional, 
complex, and sophisticated investment strategies. (Hull, 2018, p. 12). Fung and Hsieh 
(1999) argue that the difference in return aspects between mutual funds and hedge 
funds can be explained by differences in trading strategies. Hedge funds can use 
dynamic trading strategies whereas typical mutual funds operate with methods that can 
be defined as static buy-and-hold strategies. What also further widens the gap between 
these funds, is the ability for hedge funds to use leverage through the use of for instance 
short sales, usage of derivatives, and different investment strategies (Zhan, 2011). 
Whereas the use of leverage for mutual funds is often limited or even restricted. 
Therefore, the regulation and jurisdiction of hedge funds also work differently. The 
compensation systems for hedge fund managers vary between mutual funds as well. 
(Fung & Hsieh 1999.) Bodie et al. (2014, p. 96) continue to argue that, as hedge funds 
are structured rather as private partnerships and therefore accountable to less 
regulation by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).  
Due to this lack of regulations, hedge funds have been under a rising level of 
supervision after the devastating events of 2008. For research purposes the main 
financial crises or market downfalls in 1998, 2001, 2008, and 2020 offer an interesting 
opportunity to study different hedge fund strategies and their success or failures during 
times when market conditions are extremely insecure and falling. The objective of this 
thesis is to evaluate different hedge fund strategies, their risks, and returns or losses, 
and benchmarking during crisis periods and comparison periods. This evaluation is 
done to answer the main research question: how do hedge funds succeed when 
compared to market returns during several financial crises and how success is 
determined by the strategy that the hedge fund is practicing? 
Hedge funds can leverage themselves pretty much to the extent they wish, and their 
fee structure differs vastly compared to a normal investing advisory and to mutual 
funds. According to Liang (2000), hedge funds are described as alternative investment 
instruments. Other alternative investment options include mainly private equity, real 
assets, and structured products. In order to analyze hedge funds and alternative 
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investments, the distinction between traditional and alternative assets first needs to be 
clarified. 
Hedge funds can leverage themselves pretty much to the extent they wish, and their 
fee structure differs vastly compared to a normal investing advisory and to mutual 
funds. According to Liang (2000), hedge funds are described as alternative investment 
instruments. Other alternative investment options include mainly private equity, real 
assets, and structured products. In order to analyze hedge funds and alternative 
investments, first, the distinction between traditional and alternative assets first needs 
to be clarified. 
Nowadays, in the 21st-century, traditional investments mainly include equities (like 
corporate stocks) and investment-grade bonds (the debt that is issued by corporations 
and the government). On the other hand, “alternative” investing includes the 
distinctive following features. First of all, investment returns are driven by the 
exposure to assets with nontraditional cash flow - for instance venture capital, life 
insurance contracts, farmland and even art, which renders returns less correlated with 
returns from stock markets. The second feature is that alternative investment returns 
are often driven by complicated trading strategies that involve leverage, financial 
derivates and short sales, which cause them to gain unusual risk-exposures and 
flexibility. The third main characteristic of alternative assets is that investment returns 
are built in a way that they generate nontraditional payouts (such as in collateralized 
debt obligations or CDOs). So, when comparing traditional-, and alternative 
investments, what combines these three features is the distinct case of investments 
returns. Alternative asset returns do not follow the returns of traditional asset classes, 
which means that they need more specialized methods of analysis. Therefore, 
alternative investing opportunities may help an investor reduce their risk through 
diversification, enhance returns through alpha, and avoid obsolescence. (Chambers, 
Black & Lacey, 2018, pp. 5–6.) 
This research will mainly focus on hedge funds, since they are the most commonly 
used option for performing investing in alternative investments. The popularity of 
hedge funds has risen remarkably ever since the first hedge fund was introduced in 
1949 (Caldwell 1995). As of the 3rd Quarter 2020, the total of the assets under 
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management (AUM) for the entire hedge fund industry amounts to approximately 
$3379.6 billion (Barclay Hedge 2020). Additionally, Patton (2009) gives a perspective 
to the growth of the hedge fund industry by comparing hedge fund assets under 
management in 1990 ($50 billion) and in 2004 ($1 trillion). 
The main focus of this thesis is to analyze the performance of different hedge fund 
strategies against market returns during bullish, average, and bearish market 
conditions over the time period from 1997 until 2020. Main research questions within 
this study pursue to answer, a) whether overall hedge fund performance is market 
neutral and positive when compared to market returns even during the periods of 
financial crises, b.) are hedge funds able to capture excess alpha and differentiated beta 
exposures during financial crises, or are all hedge funds just as correlated with market 
returns as traditional investment vehicles are, c.) besides, this thesis pursues to answer 
questions concerning genuine risks affecting hedge funds' ability to create value and 
gain profits. 
The data used within this study is obtained from BarclayHedge and includes monthly 
data of different hedge fund strategy returns between the period of January 1997 and 
November 2020. To create an as versatile preview of hedge funds as possible, 18 
different hedge fund indices strategies returns are compared against market returns that 
are defined by FF3- factors and proxied by the commonly used risk-free indicator of 
one-month U.S government T-bill rate. (French, 2020). One strategy out of these 18 
allocations is known as the “Barclay Hedge Fund Index” which is included for the sake 
of comparison, representing the entire hedge fund industry captured by the database 
BarclayHedge. In the course of this thesis, it will be discussed as part of the 18 hedge 
fund strategies as it is one general option for performing hedge fund investing as well, 
even though it is a combination of all different hedge fund strategies rather than a 
simple distinctive strategy itself. 
The first model used in the analysis of hedge fund returns against market returns during 
the overall period of 1997 to 2020 is a single index model, the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM). The second model employed in this study is an augmented version of 
CAPM which includes a crisis dummy (𝐼𝐶𝑅) and an interaction term between market 
returns and crisis dummy variables. The augmented version of CAPM is used in order 
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to capture the authentic differences in the alpha and beta of hedge fund strategies over 
the courses of several financial crises and during the average comparison periods 
between 1997 and 2020. The main financial crises affecting hedge fund returns and 
market conditions considered in this thesis are the crises in 1998, 2001, 2008 and 2020. 
The quantity of months of financial crisis during each crisis is based on the definitions 
introduced by Jiang and Kelly (2012), National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER, 
2021), and Ding, Levine, Lin and Xie (2020). 
Empirical results indicate that most hedge fund strategies are not able to create 
statistically significant excess alpha during several financial crises when compared to 
normal periods. Furthermore, even though hedge fund neutrality measures such as beta 
coefficients and correlation are seemingly small during times of market tranquillity, 
values increase promptly during financial crises. These results are in line with existing 
empirical literature on hedge fund performance such as presented by Billio, 
Getmansky Sherman and Pelizzon (2010). 
This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 form the theoretical part of this 
thesis, and include the implications concerning risks and characteristics influencing 
the overall success of the hedge fund industry during financial crises. Chapter 4 gives 
a detailed description of different hedge fund strategies, their implications, their 
tendencies during bullish or bearish market conditions, and also defines investing 
behaviours. Chapter 5 focuses on data-related topics including a comprehensive 
description of biases affecting hedge fund-related data, the methodology, and research 
methods employed within this thesis as well as the summary statistics computed as 
part of this thesis of hedge fund strategy returns and assets under management. Chapter 
6 summarizes the main findings of this research and attempts to answer the research 
questions determined upon this thesis. Besides, the empirical performance of different 
hedge fund strategies' performance against market returns during financial crises and 
comparison periods are represented and analyzed to a great extent and amplitude. 
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2 HEDGE FUND RETURN AND RISK CHARACTERISTICS 
There are many considerable practical issues when evaluating hedge funds. The risk 
profile of hedge funds - meaning their total volatility and their exposure to systematic 
risk factors- may change quickly, especially when compared to mutual funds, as hedge 
funds can alter their investment strategies opportunistically. The unsteadiness of hedge 
funds makes evaluating their exposure to certain risks difficult. Hedge funds heavily 
invest on illiquid assets; therefore, the true alpha of hedge funds needs to be 
distinguished from the liquidity premiums. Measuring the rates of returns can be 
difficult since the pricing of assets traded inactively is complex. Hedge funds also 
pursue strategies that may provide possible gains over a long period of time, while 
exposing the fund to uncommon but harsh losses. Therefore, estimating the true risk-
return trade-off of hedge funds over long periods of time is necessary but difficult. Due 
to the ability of hedge funds to change their risk profiles, the manipulation of 
traditional performance determinants is also possible. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2014, 
p. 853.)   
According to Agarwal and Naik (2004), estimating hedge fund- related risks is 
important because many hedge funds propose a risk-free rate as a benchmark for 
calculating and claiming incentive fees. Chamber et al. (2018, p. 146) show that even 
though traditional investments are often perceived as connected to a normal probability 
distribution, alternative assets such as hedge funds tend to require rather more skill-
based strategies. The possibility for extreme outcomes is much more present among 
alternative assets, and the process of measurement and management of the portfolio is 
not an easy task. The complexity in the context of hedge funds arises from different 
types of risk exposures and from natural conflicts, such as agent problems between 
hedge fund managers and their clients. (Chambers et al., 2018, p. 146.) 
Khandani and Lo (2007) argue that credit and liquidity risk present the most common 
considerable risks among hedge funds. Even though they are considered as 
independent sources of risk exposures to investors and hedge funds, they are viewed 
as closely related by many investors after the problems experienced by LTCM and 
other similar hedge funds with fixed-income relative value during the financial crisis 
of 1998. Liang and Park (2010) show that factors such as age, size, performance and 
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lockup provisions provide good measurements for predicting possible hedge fund 
failures.  
2.1 Systematic Risk 
A risk that remains - even after significant level of diversification- is called a market 
risk, while a diversifiable risk is called a nonsystematic risk. Systematic risk factors 
originate from market-wide risks and are therefore often referred to as market risks 
(Bodie et al., 2014, p. 206).  The risk profiles of hedge funds (their total volatility and 
systematic factors) may vary rapidly due to changes in their investment strategies - a 
fact which also makes continuous measuring of systematic risk exposures more 
difficult. (Bodie et al., 2014, p. 853). 
A systematic risk is a risk that cannot be diversified, and it emerges from the 
correlation between the returns of the whole market and in this instance, the returns of 
a hedge fund. Generally speaking, investors that bear more systematic risks expect a 
higher compensation than a risk-free rate. (Hull, 2018, p. 128). The systematic risk of 
investments is usually measured by beta, which compares the sensitiveness of returns 
on specific investments to returns of the whole market. Muhtaseb and Colborn (2012) 
add that hedge funds usually pursue returns that are separate from the returns of the 
market, hence beta measures a security´s exposure to the market risk. If the calculated 
beta for an investment is one, it means that it follows market returns completely, 
whereas if it is zero, it means the asset’s returns are not sensitive compared to returns 
exhibited in the market. (Hull, 2018, p. 75.) 
In Figure number 1, n demonstrates the level of diversification inside an investment’s 
portfolio on the x-axis, while on the y-axis, r demonstrates the lessening risk via added 
investment particles. From this graph we can notice that the systematic risk - or market 
risk- stays on a constant level, even when a portfolio is more diversified. 
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Figure 1. Systematic risk compared to unsystematic risk as the level of diversification arises 
(according to Bodie, Kane, Marcus & Mohanty 2014, 207) 
Bali, Brown and Caglayan (2012) argue that contrary to the popular understanding that 
hedge funds are market neutral, the exposure of hedge funds to systematic risk explains 
the dispersion of cross-sectional returns more significantly than their exposure to tail 
risk and residual risk does. Furthermore, Bali et al. (2012) show that the systematic 
risk of individual hedge funds can be calculated as the difference between the total risk 
and the residual risk of hedge funds. In addition to this, they show that after controlling 
other hedge fund- related factors such as residual risk, age, size, incentive and 
management fees, lagged returns, lockup periods, minimum investment restrictions 
and leverage, all the results show a significant and positive relationship between the 
predictions of the hedge funds’ future returns and the systematic risk. In some 
situations, the predictive capability in regard to systematic risk arises from the ability 
of hedge funds to detect shifts in financial markets, and their skills to adjust their 
positions timewise, whenever changes in economic or financial situations occur. (Bali 
et al., 2012.) 
Brown, Hwang, In and Kim (2013) argue that the relationship between systematic risk 
and hedge funds is theoretically the correlation between real economic activities and 
hedge funds. Hedge funds pose a systematic risk to real economic activities by 
hampering the capability of financial markets or intermediaries to provide credit 
through many distinctive mechanisms. 
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Chambers et al. (2018, p. 63) point out that the traditional systematic risk factors 
concerning hedge funds are equity market risk, credit risk, and interest rate risk. One 
goal of hedge funds is to invest in different sets of systematic risk factors, and by doing 
so to achieve a better mixture of returns and risks. Bali et al. (2012) show that hedge 
funds within the highest systematic risk quintile generate on average of 6% more 
returns annually than the funds within the lowest risk quintile. Even when systematic 
risk factors are controlled, the relation between future fund returns and residual risk is 
insignificant. When the two main categorizations of hedge fund strategies are 
perceived, the effects of systematic risk effects increase as the strategy shifts from least 
directional strategies to most directional strategies, implying a much robust 
relationship among future returns and systematic risk for funds, with considerable 
time-series variation in systematic risk. (Bali et al., 2012.) 
The recent financial crisis in 2007-2009 made some implications for reforming the 
regulation within the hedge-fund industry. Arguments for reforming the regulation 
originate mainly from the necessity to improve the protection of investors. But, since 
investor protection is not much related to systematic risk, the best way to deal with 
investor protection might not be the best way to deal with systematic risk. This implies 
that the systematic risk that hedge funds add to the international financial system is not 
addressed with the registration of hedge funds. Given the fact that hedge funds have 
started to play a significant role within the financial markets, they cause external 
effects on the economy that should not be neglected. Also, what poses a risk to 
financial markets in general is the fact that restraints of hedge fund liquidity can occur 
simultaneously within an entire sector, which can then potentially lead to catastrophic 
consequences for the entire financial system. (Khandani & Lo, 2007.)  
2.1.1 Non-linear hedge fund risks 
The need for using nonlinear methods emerges from the fact that linear factor models 
such as APT and CAPM, which are usually used as a foundation for empirical and 
theoretical asset pricing literature restrict the relationship between returns and risk 
factors as if they were linear. However, most hedge fund returns are not characterized 
as linear and therefore, in order to price securities correctly, a nonlinear function is 
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needed for the risk factors. Due to this nonlinear relationship, hedge funds are exposed 
to tail risk, which is hard to diversify. (Agarwal & Naik, 2004.) 
According to Agarwal and Naik (2004), it is important to allow a non-linear risk-return 
relationship while evaluating hedge funds. This means that non-linear option-like 
payoffs should not be restricted only to risk arbitrageurs and trend followers but should 
also be featured in a variety of hedge fund strategies. Along with this non-linear 
exposure to the equity market index, hedge funds also display significant risk exposure 
to factors of value, size, and momentum. Agarwal and Naik (2004) add that traditional 
portfolios with mean-variance framework underestimate losses more substantially 
when the portfolios have low volatility. The expected tail-losses of mean-variance 
portfolios tend to be underestimated as tremendously as 54% when compared to M-
CVaR optimized portfolios. Therefore, ignoring the tail risks of hedge funds could 
result in significantly greater losses during times when markets are going down. 
(Agarwal & Naik, 2004.) 
According to Agarwal and Naik (2004), performance and returns during the last 
decade are not representative of the long-term performance of hedge funds. For 
instance, the expected losses beyond Value-at-Risk (VaR) during the period of 1927-
1989 are twice the size of those experienced during the 90s. Mean returns during the 
period of 1927-1989 are much lower, and their standard deviations are much higher 
compared to recent performance of hedge funds. This implies that long-run returns 
were lower at that time, volatilities were higher and tail losses were greater across 
almost all hedge fund indexes in comparison to those during the recent periods. These 
results give important indications for risk management and portfolio decisions, such 
as constructing and benchmarking a hedge fund. Therefore, hedge fund benchmarking, 
hedge fund tail risk, stability and manager compensation should raise crucial concerns 
among investors. (Agarwal & Naik, 2004.) 
2.1.2 Credit risk 
Brown et al. (2013) show that hedge funds and financial intermediaries are directly 
connected to each other through credit risk exposures. These exposures originate from 
prime brokerage activities, trading counterparty exposures in OTC markets and 
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financing of short-run leveraged positions. Using high levels of leverage is one of the 
main features of hedge funds, therefore evaluating credit risk as a risk-component is 
vital. Credit risk emerges from the possible outcome that borrowers and their 
counterparties may default. It is therefore considered to be one of the most important 
risks among financial institutions, and most of financial institutions dedicate 
remarkable resources to managing and measuring it. (Hull, 2018. p. 542). 
Bodie et al. (2014, p. 468) add that credit risk, which can also be defined as Bond 
default risk, is often measured by Standard & Poor´s Corporation, Moody´s Investor 
Services and Fitch Investors Services. These corporations provide financial data 
combined with quality ratings of vast corporate bond issues. The quality ratings of 
each firm’s bonds reflect its risks of resulting defaults. For instance, bonds rated BBB 
or above by S&P or Fitch are viewed as investment-grade bonds, implying a small 
possibility of a default. Bonds that are rated beneath these grades are defined as junk 
bonds or speculative-investment grade bonds, which implies a higher possibility of 
defaults. 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is often described as a credit crisis when due to 
increasing amounts of defaults, the lending among financial institutions stopped 
functioning. Many defaults resulted from the sequence of other defaults which means 
that many lenders were exposed to defaults from institutions they were not directly 
trading with. Such situations also create additional systematic risk in the markets. 
(Bodie et al., 2014, p. 477.) 
There are certain ways for banks and other financial institutions to mitigate their 
exposures to credit risk. One of which is by using credit derivatives. Credit derivatives 
can be used to transfer the credit risk from one company to another and for diversifying 
credit risk, by swapping one type of risk exposure with another. The most common 
form of credit derivative is a credit default swap or CDS. Credit default swap is a 
certain type of contract or agreement in which a company buys an insurance from 
another company to counter the possibility of third companies defaulting. (Hull, 2018, 
p. 591.) 
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Moreover, Chambers et al. (2018, p. 96) assert that a hedge fund manager that wishes 
to transfer its exposure to a certain risk - regarding for instance corporate debts- can 
use CDSs to make these shifts effectively and promptly. For instance, fixed-income 
arbitrage hedge fund managers can take offsetting positions as buyers and sellers via 
CDS agreements by applying their skills to analyze credit risk. Therefore, credit 
default swaps are a great way to create synthetic exposures to corporate bonds that 
provide increased liquidity of hedge fund portfolios, mitigated transaction costs, and 
superior capability to reduce exposures to credit risk. (Chambers et al., 2018, p. 96.) 
2.2 Illiquidity related risks 
In theory, liquidity is the ability for an investor to gain or liquidate one´s assets. For 
instance, when investing in equity markets, one has an almost instant access to funds 
if needed. Buying stocks or bonds can be described as traditional investing methods. 
Alternative investments such as hedge funds, private equity, real assets, and structured 
products provide different types of liquidity compared to traditional investments. 
Access to and liquidation of alternative assets can be restricted. Investing in hedge 
funds places asset allocators under a certain risk of illiquidity, since many private 
hedge fund products are potentially illiquid. The infrequency of trades inside hedge 
funds lowers their liquidity, and an increasing amount of hedge funds only post a net 
asset value, or NAV at the end of the month, which means that money can only be 
withdrawn or added to the fund at the end of each calendar month. In addition to this, 
many hedge funds have specific calendar requirements for withdrawals from or 
additions to the fund, and funds may include a mandatory notice before redemptions. 
Some hedge funds only have monthly subscriptions and quarterly redemptions with a 
notice of 30 days, which gives the hedge fund manager time to liquidate the fund’s 
positions for the investor’s redemptions, but also adds illiquidity to an investment. 
(Chambers et al., 2018, pp. 22–23.) 
Joenväärä and Tolonen (2008) state that it is typical for hedge funds to enforce 
redemption and lockup periods. Mutual funds often provide a daily liquidation of 
assets for their clients, meaning that liquidation is managed daily while hedge funds 
are less regularly entirely open-end funds. According to Bodie et al. (2014, p. 96), 
lock-up periods in hedge funds allow hedge fund managers to invest in more illiquid 
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assets, since the redemption of assets is restricted by lock-up periods. Thus, due to 
light regulation, hedge funds are able to resort to investment strategies such as short 
sales, usage of derivates and use of leverage, all of which are not achievable in mutual 
funds. Agarwal, Ruenzi and Weigert (2017) add that since the funds including longer 
lockup periods are more likely to invest in illiquid securities, they are also more prone 
to tail risk. 
When discussing particular hedge fund strategies, Khandani and Lo (2007) point out 
that the serious increase in strategies for illiquidity of long/short equity over the past 
decade can be explained by the proliferation of equity funds and capital per fund, with 
the addition in the amount of leverage used within each fund. However, some hedge 
fund styles, exclusively those categorized as relative-value and event-driven strategies, 
may include highly concentrated, levered, or illiquid underlying investments, which 
can require investors to sustain longer holding periods. Hedge fund strategies which 
hold distressed debt, unlisted equity securities, illiquid fixed-income securities, or 
other illiquid and levered positions may include lockup periods for the investor that 
can require keeping their assets inside the fund from one to three years. (Khandani & 
Lo, 2007). Lockup periods are described as hard or soft. In soft lockup periods, 
investors may redeem investments early by paying a commission of 1% to 3% of the 
amount they are redeeming. In hard lockup periods, investors are not able to redeem 
their investments at all during the lockup period. (Chambers et al., 2018, pp. 23–24.) 
Joenväärä and Tolonen (2008) suggest that the flexibility provided by a restriction of 
shares allows hedge fund managers that have lockup fees to take a surplus risk. Hedge 
funds with a lockup provision tend to convey lower Sharpe ratios than comparable 
funds without lockup conditions. Joenväärä and Tolonen (2008) further state that funds 
are prone to impose lockup periods when they have intentions to invest in higher risk-
containing assets, while longer-notice periods for asset are used when managing 
illiquid investments. 
In addition to lockup periods, some hedge funds may include gates that can delay 
redemption or withdrawal requests even beyond the lockup period in order to protect 
the investor’s capital during times when markets are facing extraordinary and illiquid 
situations. One good example is the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Many debt issuers 
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were trading with gigantic credit spreads and excessively low prices. Rather than 
allowing hedge fund investors to withdraw their positions, which would force hedge 
fund managers to sell these positions at very distressed prices, many credit-weighted 
hedge-funds established gates to postpone the redemption petitions of their investors. 
This created a situation in which redemption requests that were submitted in the 
beginning of 2009 were not actually fulfilled until the year 2010, when credit market 
habituates had already balanced, and prices had recovered to the point where the 
impact of redemptions was limited. (Chambers et al., 2018, pp. 23–24.) 
Illiquidity should not only be considered as an inconvenience defined as the 
inefficiency to sell existing investments at sensibly attractive prices without needing 
to take additional exposure as it also adds substantially risk in a portfolio. For instance, 
if we take into consideration the previous financial crisis in 2007-2009, many hedge 
funds and other alternative investments suffered major substantial losses in terms of 
liquidation, because the liquidation values were extraordinarily low. Concerning 
alternative assets, the unavailability of market prices exposes investors to increased 
costs for data gathering, monitoring, exiting and financial analysis. (Chambers et al., 
pp. 90-92.) 
Bodie et al. (2014, p. 312) point out that in order to offset the risks and inconveniences 
suffered through illiquidity, additional benefits must be gained by the investors 
through increased compensation, so as to keep them motivated in investing into assets 
that are considered more illiquid. Illiquidity premium is often set to the same level as 
the market risk premium (Bodie et al., p. 441). According to Chambers et al. (2018, p. 
148), there are two primary components to the benefits accumulated from investment: 
1.) the time value of money and 2.) the compensation for bearing risk necessary for 
the investment. Illiquidity increases the need to bear risks and therefore, the benefit as 
expected return should also increase. Liang and Park (2010) mentions that even though 
liquidation is usually considered an issue in the context of hedge funds, liquidation 
does not automatically mean failure. 
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2.2.1 Liquidity and Lehman bankruptcy 
Hull (2018, p. 4) claims that when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 
15th 2008, it was mainly due to a combination of extremely risky investments, high 
levels of leverage and problems with liquidity. In this instance, Lehman Brothers had 
increased their leverage ratio to 31:1 by 2007, which meant that in the event their asset 
value declined by 3-4%, it would destroy its capital entirely. Chambers et al. (2018, p. 
131) point out that during the financial crisis of 2008-2009, many investors struggled 
with unanticipated and problematic restrictions when trying to redeem their 
investments. For that reason, all investors should carefully evaluate potential 
redemption restrictions when allocating resources towards hedge funds. Agarwal et al. 
(2017) argue that during the financial crisis of 2008, hedge funds using Lehman 
Brothers as their prime broker witnessed higher levels of tail risk compared to other 
funds, which leads to the conclusion that funding liquidity shocks enhances tail risk. 
2.3 Illiquidity shocks and contagion of hedge funds 
Boyson, Stahel and Stulz (2010) discuss the effects of shocks to hedge fund liquidity 
between 1990-2008 and the fact that these liquidity shocks might be one of the main 
reasons for an increased probability of contagion in hedge funds. According to Boyson 
et al. (2010), large shocks to credit spreads, bank stock prices, stock market liquidity 
and hedge fund flows are correlated with a significant increase in the probability of 
hedge fund contagion. In this context, contagion means the event in which one bad 
outcome also affects or generates another. Between 1990 and 2008, the worst hedge 
fund returns cluster across different hedge-fund styles, and by using both parametric 
and semi-parametric analyses, Boyson et al. (2010) show that clustering or contagion 
cannot be explained by the risk factors commonly used to explain hedge fund 
performance.  
According to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), an adverse shock to the funding 
liquidity of hedge funds forces them to reduce their leverage and contributes less 
liquidity to the markets, which then reduces asset liquidity. Adrian et al. (2011) 
describe these situations as liquidity spirals, in which initial losses in some asset 
classes may force investors that leverage their holdings with great magnitude to reduce 
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their positions, which in turn leads to additional losses and potential spillover of these 
losses to other asset classes. If the impact of the funding liquidity shock on the asset 
liquidity is heavy enough, the decrease in asset liquidity makes funding even more 
inflexible for speculators, which causes a self-reinforcing liquidity spiral. In such a 
spiral, both the funding liquidity and the asset liquidity continue to crumble. (Boyson 
et al., 2010). Adrian et al. (2011) note that issues related to liquidity spirals spread 
distress of financial crisis across many institutions and therefore, in regard to financial 
stability, understanding to which degree various hedge fund strategies simultaneously 
experience vast losses is important. 
The financial crisis of 2008 could be described as a credit crisis which emphasized the 
role of liquidity spirals: the impact of the subprime crisis regarding Collateralized Debt 
Obligations (CDO), Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and Mortgage-Backed Securities 
(MBS) on margins led to a sharp reduction in liquidity in most asset markets during 
the second half of 2008. In relation to this, the clustering of hedge fund returns was 
also really dramatic. (Adrian et al., 2011.) 
According to Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009), shocks to asset liquidity and to the 
funding liquidity of hedge funds lead to poor performance of assets and hence, lead to 
hedge fund contagion. While Brunnermeier´s and Pedersen´s (2009) research focuses 
more on the severe effects of financial crises, the research made by Boyson et al. 
(2010) studies the coincidence of poor performance in hedge funds since 1990 by 
including eight different hedge fund styles: convertible arbitrage, distressed securities, 
event driven, equity hedge, global macro, equity market neutral, merger arbitrage and 
relative value arbitrage. They demonstrate that large negative shocks to asset liquidity 
and to the funding liquidity of hedge funds make hedge fund contagion more probable. 
Boyson et al. (2010) show that there is very strong evidence and association of 
contagion in hedge fund returns. As a result, from a lower level of leverage, asset 
liquidity inside hedge-funds worsens, which then leads to even further deleveraging. 
In turn, a similar shock to funding liquidity leads to deleveraging, which then reduces 
asset liquidity within hedge funds as well. It is shown that small shifts in liquidity are 
not associated with hedge fund contagion. The shifts in liquidity need to be vast and 
radical for the liquidity to be associated with hedge fund contagion. Hedge funds seem 
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to share a common exposure to large liquidity shocks such as previous financial crises, 
and the current models explaining hedge fund returns do not sufficiently apprehend 
this exposure. (Boyson et al., 2010.) 
2.4 Option like nature of manager-incentive fees 
In order for hedge funds to succeed, they need their managers to be flexible, successful 
and especially skilled. Chambers et al. (2018, p. 24) show that the competence of hedge 
fund managers is financially compensated with management fees. Management fees 
are often calculated as a percentage of the assets under management and incentive fees 
as a percentage of the fund´s profit (Adrian et al., 2011). Often, the annual management 
fee ranges between 1% - 2% of the assets, and it is a fee paid regardless of hedge fund’s 
performance. Incentive fee is based on the performance of the hedge fund, usually paid 
annually, and it accounts for between 10%-20% of all new profits generated by the 
fund. Due to the previous financial crisis of 2008, management fees for large 
institutional allocations have dropped to between 1,5% and 15%.  (Chambers et al., 
2018, p. 24.) 
Chambers et al. (2018, pp. 24–26) point out that incentive fees have an embedded 
tendency for a moral hazard. While traditional mutual funds only charge a flat 
management fee that is not affected by the success of the fund, hedge funds include 
managerial incentive fees that increase with the returns generated by the fund. In this 
case, moral hazard lies between the investors and hedge fund managers. Investors are 
concerned that the previously mentioned incentive fees may increase unnecessary risk-
taking by hedge fund managers. If a general partner (the manager of the hedge fund) 
earns an incentive fee of 20 % profit and all the while does not share the possible 
drawbacks of losses, they can be prone to invest in highly volatile strategies. In this 
particular situation, managers profit even more when the risk-taking is fruitful and they 
do not carry the burden of possible losses. The incentive fees described in this situation 
can be explained as a call option that is held by a hedge fund manager against the 
performance of the fund. Similarly, like having a call option on the fund´s assets, an 
option-like feature could provide a large positive return when the fund´s assets are 
gaining in value and could exclude an exposure to losses in the event that the value of 
the fund´s assets declines. (Chambers et al., 2018, pp. 24–26.) 
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Jiang and Kelly (2012) show that when hedge fund managers do not invest their own 
wealth in funds they are managing, standard principal-agent problems arise. In these 
situations, the manager is willing to take additional risks in order to gain more 
incentive fees and capture more inflows towards the fund. Adrian et al. (2011) show 
that while reducing risks could be advantageous to the fund manager in that it would 
lower the hedge fund’s exposure to tail risk, managers still have strong incentives to 
take additional risks, as they tend to expand possibilities for additional incentive and 
management fees. Agarwal et al. (2017) add that call option characteristics of a 
managerial incentive fee are positively associated with hedge fund tail risk. Features 
of the incentive fees such as the call option encourage managers to take additional tail 
risk-tilted investments. 
Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2009) show that funds with higher managerial incentives 
and ownership, strict withdrawals, and other managerial restrictions report better 
returns compared to risk-adjusted funds. These findings strongly suggest that hedge 
fund contracts are indeed compelling in motivating managerial efforts and mitigating 
agency problems within hedge funds. According to Chambers et al. (2018, pp. 26–27), 
the moral hazard of incentive fees and the very high levels of risk-taking by hedge 
fund managers can be offset to some extent by including the managers’ own personal 
wealth into the fund. This method includes both variations: the incentive to make good 
results and earn incentive fees, but also the negative aspect of the general partners 
losing something along with the limited partners, which refrains managers from having 
an audacious investment behavior. The possible downside with a large personal capital 
involvement of hedge fund managers in funds is that if their own financial security is 
endangered, they might not take sufficient risk in order to obtain the optimal results 
that primarily characterize hedge funds. 
2.5 Tail Risk 
Why is it important for an investor to evaluate tail-risk and other risks related to hedge 
funds? Usually, tail-risks are considered as extremely negative and unwanted factors 
in respect to profits, since tail losses can be colossal for hedge funds. Jiang and Kelly 
(2012) argue that hedge funds witness constant exposures to tail-risks and other 
extreme downside risks.  Tail-risk is often correlated with illiquidity, and the 
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possibility for tail risk- related problems is even more present in situations in which 
the hedge fund is highly leveraged. In the occurrence of disastrous events, the capital 
of highly leveraged hedge funds might be obliterated, as the fund struggles to liquidate 
its funds and allow the withdrawal for its investors. (Jiang & Kelly, 2012.) 
Chambers et al. (2018, p. 121) argue that since many alternative investment variations, 
such as hedge funds, offer a possibility for both elevated returns and increased tail-
risk, it is vital for investors to bear some level of tail-risk in order to capture well-
diversified portfolios with great returns. Tail-risk measures the possibility and 
harshness of the risk of extreme outcomes. Often, tail-risk originates from the tail left 
in the distribution of returns (Bodie et al., 2014, p. 148). Most investment strategies 
usually expose the investor to some level of tail-risk, and it is not a question of whether 
an investment strategy has a tail risk but is rather about to which extent the tail is 
severe, and whether it is properly managed and understood. Generally, alternative 
investments tend to contain more tail-risk than traditional investments. (Chambers et 
al., 2018, p. 114.) 
Agarwal et al.  (2017) show that the main determinants for tail-risk are discretion, and 
an exposure to funding liquidity shocks and managerial incentives. Agarwal et al. 
(2017) also argue that the sources of tail-risk mostly originate from the tendency of 
hedge funds to put writing strategies via equity markets as well as from equity-based 
tail risk factors such as investments in stocks with high tail-risk. On the contrary, funds 
taking longer positions in equity-put options tend to witness lower consequences of 
tail risk. 
Chambers et al. (2018, pp. 115–121) point out that tail-risk generally originates from 
the following issues: changes over time in an investment strategy called the investment 
strategy drift, a strategy drift towards higher risk or leverage, rogue traders, operational 
failures, and issues regarding fraudulent actions. In order to mitigate the effects of tail-
risks, investors are obligated to perform due diligence on their investments, monitor 
the funds, follow the money, and pay some attention to the fund culture into which the 
investor is willing or trying to invest their assets.  
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According to Adrian et al. (2011), hedge funds are more susceptible to tail-risk related 
issues during times of crisis. Adrian et al. (2011) add that it is vital for overall risk 
management and other financial stability aspirations to understand the degree to which 
different hedge fund strategies are prone to tail risks and tail-risk related problems 
which arise markets are in turmoil. Patton (2009) proposes the possibility that some 
hedge fund strategies categorized as market neutral may have secured themselves from 
tail risk. Market neutral hedge funds are sometimes described as market-tail neutral. 
In addition, Jiang and Kelly (2012) show that some hedge fund strategies are more 
exposed than others to poor results related to tail-risk. In particular, strategies that 
invest in emerging markets and long-short equity hedge fund strategies especially 
exposed. More precisely, one standard deviation shock to tail-risk is followed by a 
4,44% annual drop in long-short equity strategy and a whopping 7,20% drop in the 
hedge fund strategy of emerging markets. Adrian et al. (2011) argue that tail 
sensitiveness among different hedge-fund strategies is greater during times of financial 
distress in the markets, which suggests that potential simultaneous losses among hedge 
funds during financial distress do exist. 
On the other hand, Jiang and Kelly (2012) point out that tail risks have a vast impact 
on asset prices, even though crashes of hedge fund markets are rather infrequent. 
Hedge funds can be thought of as strategies that provide insurance against possible 
market crashes. In consequence, they earn attractive premiums during tranquil market 
conditions and suffer severe losses in bad market conditions or within tail events. 
Therefore, the question arises about whether or not the returns enjoyed by hedge funds 
during tranquility times compensate the tail-riskiness of hedge fund investments. Bali 
et al. (2007) find that hedge funds which endure higher left-tail risk outperform the 
funds with less tail-risk exposure. Gao, Gao and Song (2018) present a differing view 
on hedge fund related risks and market disasters. According to Gao et al. (2018), hedge 
funds are actually able to benefit from disastrous market conditions rather than being 
exposed to market disasters and tail risks.  
2.5.1 Value-at-Risk, Expected Shortfall and hedge fund performance  
Value-at-Risk or VaR could be defined as a measure of the worst possible loss that can 
occur over a certain period of time. (Gupta & Liang, 2005). Chambers et al. (2018, p. 
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141) explain that Value-at-Risk or VaR is an approach for estimating risks that are 
based on quantiles. For example, a 5% VaR implies the level of possible losses that 
are anticipated to be met or exceeded in 5% of the possible outcomes during some 
period. Figure 2 demonstrates VaR in the case of a symmetrical distribution. 
 
Figure 2. Value-at-Risk illustrated for symmetrical distribution (according to Chambers, Black, 
& Lacey, 2018, p. 142) 
Analysts use VaR for two main reasons. The first one is that VaR is an easily 
understandable measure of risk exposure in a certain portfolio or a position, because it 
gives the best estimate of the possibilities for numerous losses. The second major 
reason for using VaR is that it is helpful in outlining possible risks when the outcomes 
are not structured as a normal probability distribution. (Chambers et al., 2018, p. 141.) 
Gupta and Liang (2005) compare traditional risk measures and VaR to evaluate hedge 
fund risk and find that for this purpose, standard deviation is not as performant as VaR, 
due to the substantial kurtosis and negative skewness present in hedge fund returns. 
Using standard deviation and assuming a normality of hedge fund returns can result in 
underestimating the real risk of the hedge fund industry. Liang and Park (2010) also 
show that measures such as Expected Shortfall are superior to standard deviation- 
related measurements when estimating the downside risks or the failure of a hedge 
fund. Related literature from Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Liang and Park (2007) 
argues as well that measurements related to standard deviation greatly underestimate 
left-tail risks within hedge funds. 
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Bali et al. (2007) test VaR by using two large hedge fund databases from Lipper TASS 
and Hedge Fund Research – or HFR, using monthly returns of hedge funds during the 
period from 1995 and 2003. Their findings suggest that investors holding portfolios 
with higher levels of VaR can also expect superior returns, implying the existence of 
a risk premium relationship between the downside risk and the expected returns of 
hedge funds.  
As explained previously, tail risk is one of the greatest concerns regarding hedge funds. 
Bodie at al. (2014, p. 162) state that value at risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES) 
are used to measure tail risk. VaR measures the exceeding probability of incurring loss. 
For instance, when negative deviations from the normal distribution are larger and 
more frequent, a VaR of 5% may represent a 1.65 standard deviation below the average 
return. Meanwhile, the ES measures the possibility that the expected rate of return falls 
below a certain value. For instance, an ES of 1% is the expected return of all possible 
outcomes within the 1% of the normal distribution. 
Bodie et al (2014, p. 141) claim that VaR works well for estimating risks, as it totally 
ignores potential gains and digs into the downside risks of investments. For instance, 
VaR could indicate to an investor that they have a 10% possibility of losing more than 
5% in a single day. According to Bodie et al. (2014, p. 141), the problem with VaR is 
that it does not work well when estimating the possibilities of worst downside 
scenarios. For measuring extreme risk, many firms have begun using conditional value 
at risk (CVaR) or expected shortfall (ES), which show the possible losses after going 
past value at risk. CVaR makes it easier for companies to estimate the significance of 
expected losses when they are especially severe. Agarwal and Naik (2004) examine 
portfolio decisions in the light of nonlinear option-like payoffs of hedge funds and in 
order to do so, they use a conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) framework, which is 
especially useful for examining negative tail risk. VaR focuses more on the frequency 
of severe events while CVaR focuses on the frequency and size of losses in the cases 
of severe events. 
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2.6 Measuring performance of Hedge Funds 
There are two main components when estimating anticipated compensations from an 
investment. The first is the time-value of money and the second is the investment-
related compensation for enduring such investment-related necessary risks. 
Compensation for the time value of money is usually estimated with the risk-free 
interest rate of short-term government securities. Compensations for an investment-
related necessary risk are typically estimated with the risk premium of bearing 
systematic risk for different kinds of investment objects. (Chambers et al., p. 149.) 
Chambers et al. (2018, p. 143) propose that the Sharpe ratio is one of the most popular 
and simple measures of risk-adjusted performance used in traditional investing. The 
famous Sharpe ratio measures the expected return of an asset compared to a unit of 
volatility. Volatility is often measured with a standard deviation of returns. 
𝐸(𝑅) − 𝑅𝑓
𝜎
                                                                                                   (1) 
Where 𝐸(𝑅) stands for expected return, 𝑅𝑓 stands for riskless return or rate of interest 
and 𝜎 represents the volatility of the return of asset. According to Chambers et al. 
(2018, p. 143), the Sharpe ratio at its simplest could be defined as the measure of 
rewards for tolerating total risk, but the possible drawback comes from the fact that 
using volatility as a measure of risk will ignore the potential advantages of 
diversification. Other problems with the Sharpe ratio occur when assets do not include 
symmetrical distributions. Hence, a ratio called the Sortino Ratio could be used. 
(Chambers et al., 2018, p. 143.) 
The reason why focusing solely on Sharpe ratios in the case of hedge funds is not 
considered efficient comes from the nature of many hedge fund strategies, as these 
funds tend to focus less on broad diversification of assets and more on the opportunities 
that arise from momentarily mispriced securities. (Bodie et al., 2014, p. 880.) 
According to Chambers et al. (2018, pp. 143-144), the Sortino ratio modifies the 
Sharpe ratio by replacing volatility with the measure of asset´s downside risk.  The 
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downside risk is not something that is strictly defined but has a rather general way of 
using it. The Sortino ratio provides a great way for measuring the risk premium that is 
available per unit of downside risk.  
𝐸(𝑅) − 𝑅𝑓
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘
                                                                                            (2) 
When evaluating managers in the context of Hedge Funds, capture ratios are often 
utilized as well. Capture ratios measure the capability of hedge fund managers to time 
their positions with market conditions. For example, taking on additional exposures in 
systematic risk during bullish markets and taking positions with mitigated risk 
exposures during bear markets. Capture ratios greater than 1.0 during bullish markets 
indicate a profound success while measures under 1.0 suggest failure. In opposition, 
downside capture ratios under 1.0 indicate a prosperous market timing. For example, 
a downside capture ratio of 0.8 would suggest that the manager only lost 80% of what 
the index lost. (Chambers et al., 2018, p. 145.) 
2.6.1 Alpha and other important Hedge fund related factors 
Chambers et al. (2018, p. 147) explain that alpha is a great measure for assessing hedge 
fund related performance and that beta measures systematic risk. Alpha primarily has 
two distinct functions. Firstly, alpha indicates the amount of excess anticipated returns. 
For example, if a hedge fund delivers a 3% alpha annually, it means that it constantly 
outperforms the priced assets with a similar 3% risk per year. The second function of 
alpha is to measure the difference between the return of an asset and its comparable 
benchmark, after adjusting risk variances between the benchmark and the asset. For 
example, in this context a 5% alpha per annum would indicate that the hedge fund 
outperformed a properly assembled benchmark by 5% that year. 
According to Chambers et al. (2018, p. 156), one of the main reasons for investing in 
alternative assets such as hedge funds is to try and gain absolute returns, or returns that 
are not highly correlated either with macroeconomic variables or with significant asset 
classes. Good examples of hedge fund strategies pursuing absolute returns are market-
neutral hedge funds and funds specializing in some sort of arbitrage, since these funds 
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go after investment strategies that prioritize returns that are not correlated with the 
returns of traditional assets. One feature of these funds is that even though they bear 
similar risks to all hedge funds, the risk is labelled as nonsystematic. In theory, 
absolute return funds offer the advantage of earning superior returns without exposing 
the fund to additional interest-rate risk, credit risk or equity market risk. (Chambers et 
al., 2018, p. 150.) 
One particularly common index model, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
introduced by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), is frequently defined as the basic 
starting point when assessing the theoretical context of market-neutral investments and 
when assessing the relationship between returns provided by the market and by 
investment vehicles such as hedge funds. According to Muhtaseb and Colborn (2012), 
the slope of regression in the CAPM model, beta, measures the correlation and 
sensitiveness of securities against the market risk. Sharpe (1964) and Litner (1965) 
determine beta in the following manner: 
𝛽𝑓 =   
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑓,    𝑅𝑚 )
𝜎2 (𝑅𝑚 )
.                                                                                    (3) 
Hedge funds´ beta (𝛽𝑓) from equation three is obtained by dividing covariance of 
hedge fund and market returns 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑓,    𝑅𝑚 ) by the variance of the market return 
𝜎2 (𝑅𝑚 ). Patton (2009) describes the correlation and beta-based analysis of hedge 
funds neutrality against market returns as one of the most commonly used and 
straightforward methods. Patton (2009) claims that hedge fund investors aim to bring 
beta as close to zero as possible in order to gain holdings that are neutral from overall 
market movements. Muhtaseb and Colborn (2012) add that many hedge funds have 
the same target, since it then indicates that these funds provide returns that are not 
sensitive to market returns. Patton (2009) states that simple linear regression models 
such as CAPM and beta -values do not provide optimal value for assessing return 
characteristics generated by hedge funds, due to their employment of dynamic and 
complex trading strategies, as well as to the fact that hedge-fund payoffs are often 
rather nonlinear. 
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Regardless of these contributing factors presented by Patton (2009), Asness, Krail and 
Liew (2001) argue that potential investors of hedge funds simply do not have any other 
options than to rely on linear regression models such as CAPM, previous return 
characteristics and superficial descriptions of hedge fund strategies, since the 
information provided by hedge funds is often highly limited. 
Asness et al. (2001) show that since hedge funds generally provide only limited 
information about their holdings and returns characteristics, investors that are 
interested investing in hedge funds must establish their evaluation based on the history 
of returns of these hedge funds and the descriptions of their strategy. Therefore, Asness 
et al. (2001) introduce a common approach for estimating the market exposure of 
hedge-fund returns in a regression that includes the hedge fund’s monthly returns 
against S&P 500 index returns, in this case representing the overall market returns: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡  =   𝑎𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 +    𝜀𝑖,𝑡  .                                                                       (4) 
This equation is rewritten as follows: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡  −    𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡   =   𝑎𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡  .                                                                     (5) 
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represents the return on hedge fund 𝑖 net-of-fees, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 represents the return 
on the S&P 500 index excess of cash, also excluded of fees. The left side in equation 
5 represents the return of a hedge fund strategy, where 𝛽𝑖 division of units of the S&P 
500 are shorted against the purchase of a hedge fund. On the right side of equation 5, 
𝑎𝑖 represents the added value, or alpha since it is the average return for the hedge fund 
and can also be viewed as the accomplished skill of the manager. Asness et al. (2001) 
add that this regression represents an estimate of alpha, because it accounts for the 
added value that the hedge fund produces after taking into consideration the average 
market exposure, or in other words, beta. Element 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 represents the variables that 
differ from market return, and according to Asness et al. (2001), it is estimated to have 
zero mean, or no value, in this regression. This regression describes the relationship 
between market and hedge fund as being linear, which according to Patton (2009) is 
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not acceptable, since hedge funds tend to employ many different strategies for dynamic 
trading, and since payoff functions are often nonlinear. 
In addition to these measures, R-squared (𝑅2) is a commonly used statistical tool for 
analyzing a possible neutrality between hedge funds and market returns. R-squared 
measures the level to which the descriptive variable (for instance market return) 
explains the dependent variable (in this case, the returns of hedge fund strategies). 
Adjusted R-squared is used in order to mitigate the possible errors created by normal 
R-squared measures, as the latter tend to rise when more explanatory variables are 
introduced into the regression models. According to Titman and Tiu (2011), a low 𝑅2 
(closer to zero than to one) could be an indicator of managerial success and skill, 
combined with possible signs of market neutrality. Fung and Hsieh (2004) prove that 
using 𝑅2 to estimate hedge fund returns is useful. The problem with 𝑅2 in regression 
models with multiple factors, such as in the 7-factor model presented by Fung And 
Hsieh (2004), is that the value of 𝑅2 increases when more factors are included. 
Therefore, adjusted R-squared measures may have a more explanatory influence, as 
they are more neutral when additional factors are added to the model. (Fung & Hsieh, 
2004). 
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3 FINANCIAL CRISES AND HEDGE FUNDS 
Adrian, Brunnermeier and Nquyen (2011) claim that the recent global crises of 2007-
2008 presented many illustrations of broad hedge-fund failures. The financial crisis 
began in June 2007 when two highly levered structured-credit hedge-funds failed. 
Later, in March 2008, another highly levered fixed-income fund, Carlyle Capital 
Corporation (CCC) fell into bankruptcy due to margin calls. Chambers et al. (2018, p. 
114) explain that the collapse of CCC was caused by monumental leverage and risk-
measurement errors made by rating agencies, as they incorrectly assigned superior 
credit-ratings to various structured products. When Lehman Brothers failed in 
September 2008, the whole hedge fund sector experienced harsh losses. 
Jiang and Kelly (2012) show that when investigating hedge fund performance, two 
extreme crises should be taken in consideration: the financial crisis of 2007 – 2008 and 
the crisis of 1998. The earlier major crisis in 1998 is often described as the credit crisis. 
It originated with the Russian debt default which led to the collapse of a major hedge 
fund, the Long-Term Capital Management, or LTCM, and eventually affected the 
entire hedge-fund-industry returns negatively. Chambers et al. (2018, p. 115) clarify 
that LTCM´s main investment strategy focused on fixed-income arbitrage, which 
included identifying assets that are relatively mispriced. One of the main reasons why 
LTCM collapsed was the massive use of leverage combined with the liquidity crisis 
when liquidation was fulfilled with losses. 
On the other hand, the more recent financial crisis derived from crowded high-risk 
trades and, according to Hellwig (2009), from exposure to highly risky and faulty 
subprime mortgage markets. These market conditions caused unpredictable, vast, and 
rapid losses also among hedge funds. That said, Agarwal et al. (2017) argue that during 
the recent financial crisis of 2008, the tail risk among hedge funds was unquestionably 
lower than the tail risk computed among hypothetical buy-and-hold equity portfolios. 
In addition to this, they find that prior to the crisis of 2008, hedge funds increased their 
long positions in put-options. These findings suggest that during the financial crisis of 
2008, hedge funds actually on average reduced the exposure to tail risk they held prior 
to the crisis, which indicates to some extent an ability for hedge funds to time tail-
risks. 
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Jiang and Kelly (2012) show that many hedge funds which performed poorly during 
the first major crisis in 1998 had an inclination towards bad outcomes in the crisis of 
2007-2008 as well. More precisely, a 1% drop in the performance of a hedge fund in 
1998 also predicted a 0,56% drop in the crisis of 2007 -2008, implying that the funds 
performing worst in the first crisis also ended up performing poorly in the latter one. 
The predictability of poor performance is a sign of the high propensity in hedge funds 
towards exposures to extreme downside risks and tail risk.  
According to Billio et al. (2010), financial crises have certain effects on hedge funds. 
Financial crises have a major impact on hedge fund risk, and the common risk factors 
during crises are liquidity, volatility, and credit or equity markets. In addition to these 
risk factors, idiosyncratic risk factors also need to be taken in consideration, as without 
them, the effects of financial crises on hedge fund risk are grossly undervalued. These 
risks apply to many of the strategies previously mentioned in this master´s thesis. In 
this particular case, the idiosyncratic risk factors are called latent risks, and were very 
common across the hedge fund industry during the 2008 international financial crisis, 
as well as during the LTCM (Long-Term Capital Management) crisis of 1998. This 
common latent factor is also associated with well-known negative hedge fund success 
measures such as margin spirals, colossal redemptions, credit freezes, runs on hedge 
funds and market-wide panic.  
It is interesting and important to analyze hedge funds during crises, since one of the 
main attractions of hedge funds is their characteristic of low vulnerability to market 
risk. The financial crisis of 2008 showed the markets that hedge funds might not 
include as little a market risk as it is perceived, and many investors even questioned if 
these hedge funds were actually hedged. According to Billio et al. (2010), all hedge 
fund strategies performed dreadfully during the crisis of 2008. Also, as one of the main 
purposes of investing in hedge funds is their advanced level of diversification, 
according to Billio et al. (2010), the correlation of hedge fund strategies increased from 
0.32 (8/2008) to 0.52 (9/2008), which is a 64% increase. The results implicate a severe 
correlation between hedge fund strategies. Moreover, Billio et al. (2010) show that the 
average correlation of hedge fund strategies between January 1994 and December 
2008 increased with great magnitude during financial crisis periods. In particular, the 
average correlation between different hedge fund strategies rose by 50% (0.12 to 0.31) 
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in August 1998, and by 64% (0.32 to 0.52) during the more recent financial crisis of 
2008, which is quite extreme. The volatility of hedge fund strategies can vastly vary 
as well, but in any case, it greatly increases during financial crisis periods. The smallest 
changes of volatility in hedge fund strategies were in the Equity Market Neutral hedge 
strategies (38%), and the most considerable increase in volatility was in the 
Convertible Bond Arbitrage hedge fund strategy (176%). (Billio et al., 2010.) 
According to Khandani and Lo (2007), hedge funds that mainly invested in exchange-
traded equities and usually performed outstandingly, suddenly experienced 
considerable and unprecedented losses during the financial crisis of 2008. In particular, 
the hedge funds that suffered the hardest downfalls were the ones implementing 
investments in long/short equity market-neutral strategies, those very ones which do 
not generally have compelling beta exposure and are supposed to be immune to market 
fluctuations. During financial crises, the median volatility and the correlation of hedge 
fund strategies increase. Liquidity, volatility, and credit risks are the most common 
systematic factors affecting the risks in hedge funds. Moreover, funds that have an 
exposure or correlation to the S&P 500 index during crisis periods are comparably 
smaller compared to periods of tranquility. This implies that managers of hedge funds 
attempt to lessen their market exposures during times of crises and high volatility. In 
the case that common latent-risk factors and hedge fund risk exposure are left out when 
modelling risk, the effects of financial crises on hedge fund risks and their magnitude 
are highly underestimated and the benefits of hedge-fund diversification are vastly 
overestimated. In order to fully apprehend the effects of financial crises, both the latent 
and the systematic risk factor liabilities should be modeled within hedge fund risk. 
(Billio et al., 2010.) 
It is therefore legitimate to question whether hedge funds are really hedged since their 
correlation climbs so rapidly during times of financial crises. The presence of 
exposures in classical systematic-risk factors may lead to gains in correlation and 
volatility during financial crises. On the other hand, the exposure of common latent-
risk factor liabilities restrains possible benefits of diversification, increases volatility 
and correlation, and makes discovering of arbitrage positions or price inefficiencies 
harder for hedge fund managers. (Billio et al., 2010.)  
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3.1 COVID-19 and Hedge Funds 
Ding et al. (2020) argue that the economic crisis caused by COVID-19 was nothing 
like previous crises such as the one in 2008, when financial imbalances grew out of 
control. The COVID-19 crisis was mainly caused by a global pandemic that laid vast 
economic constraints on all economical activities. In order to give some perspective, 
the S&P 500 fell approximately 34% within the first quarter of 2020. Ding et al. (2020) 
use data from 6,000 different companies during the first quarter of 2020 in order to 
evaluate stock price movements and corporate features to COVID-19 events. Ding et 
al. (2020) disclose that stock prices of firms that had high levels of hedge fund 
ownership performed much worse than companies with less exposure to hedge funds. 
The reason why the stock prices of many companies move more rapidly when having 
big ownerships in hedge funds is due to two main reasons. Firstly, hedge funds 
commonly utilize quantitative trading strategies that can lead to overcrowding in 
holdings and secondly, hedge funds tend to use short-term financing to leverage their 
holdings. In the event of unfavorable news regarding COVID-19 cases or similar 
adverse shocks, these two main characteristics might cause stock prices to further drop 
among companies that have great ownerships within hedge funds. Again, when 
necessities for liquidity increase among hedge funds, they tend to sell their assets 
quickly as new unfavorable information about COVID-19 cases emerges to the 
markets, which creates downward pressure on the stock prices as well.  (Ding et al., 
2020.) 
According to He, Nagel and Song (2020), U.S Treasuries are usually perceived as one 
of the safest and most liquid assets available in the economy. Usually in a financial 
crisis, when prices of illiquid and risky assets drop drastically, the price premium and 
usage of treasuries increase. Occurrences in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic did 
not follow the normal pattern, as prices of long-term treasuries also declined abruptly. 
Hedge funds often use treasuries and repo- markets for pursuing their leveraged 
investment practices. In the context of the COVID-19 crisis, hedge funds that were 
employing heavy-cash future-based trading had to lower their degrees of leverage, 
after facing significant losses that followed the turmoil in treasury markets. (He et al., 
2020.) 
39 
4 HEDGE FUND STRATEGIES 
Bodie et al. (2014, p. 928) state that hedge fund strategies could be divided into two 
main categories: directional and non-directional strategies. The functions of 
directional strategies are rather easy to interpret, as they simply take chances on one 
sector of the markets outperforming another. On the other hand, non-directional 
strategies seek to take advantage of situations in which certain security valuations are 
misaligned. When investors are selecting potential funds to invest in, both operational 
and investment due diligence should be performed in addition to investment strategy 
returns and risks (Chambers et al., 2018, p. 28). 
Fung and Hsieh (2001) point out that hedge fund strategies often include option-like 
returns. Chambers et al. (2018, p. 37) explain that hedge fund strategies can differ 
extensively. What generally differentiates hedge fund strategies are their features of 
including risks (lower to higher) and their defensive to more bullish aspects within the 
strategy. Managed-future and macro funds have a tendency to profit in times of market 
downfalls and crises, whereas most of equity hedge funds flourish in times of bullish 
and rising equity markets. Relative-value funds and event-driven funds focus on 
security-specific tendencies, seeking to profit from market inefficiencies. The above-
mentioned funds operate best in stable and normal market surroundings, when credit 
spreads are also stable and equity market prices are rising due to economic growth. On 
the other hand, these strategies suffer in value during times of uncertainty and crisis. 
(Chambers et al., 2018, p. 37.) 
According to Khandani and Lo (2007), there is a clear distinction between hedge fund 
strategies. Hedge fund strategies can mainly be categorized either in statistical 
arbitrage, long/short equity, or quantitative equity market-neutral strategies. Statistical 
arbitrage refers to deeply technical and rather short-term strategies. These strategies 
involve numerous securities, short holding periods and massive computational trading 
with a big IT infrastructure. On the other hand, quantitative strategies could rather be 
described as “general”, as they involve more types of models, fewer securities, and 
adds other alternatives to historical prices such as earnings projections, accounting 
variables and economic indicators. As to long/short equity strategies, they are 
considered as the broadest, since they can basically include any kind of equity 
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portfolios (short-selling, market-neutral, long-biased, and fundamental stock-pickers) 
and in most hedge-fund related databases, they are described as the largest category in 
terms of the number of funds and assets. (Khandani & Lo, 2007.) 
This thesis will mainly focus on four variations of hedge fund strategies. They are 
categorized as follows: macro and managed-future funds, relative-value funds, event-
driven hedge funds and equity hedge funds. Since these four general variations of 
hedge funds include many subtypes that are utterly different from each other, it is 
presumably enough to examine only them. Each subtype differs in terms of returns, 
risks, and trading practices. Many of the hedge fund strategies within this thesis 
include variations of arbitrage, hedging and varying short and/or long positions. 
Therefore, it is relevant to first define these variables. 
4.1 Hedge fund strategies related variables 
As the following strategies within this thesis include many mentions and implications 
of the concept of arbitrage, it is best to first clarify the meaning of this concept. 
Basically, arbitrage can be described as an investment strategy which ensures superior 
return without risks. In the real world, this is not viewed as something accessible, and 
in practice, arbitrage is defined as a strategy that attempts to exploit market 
inefficiencies and generate profits by doing so (Brealey, Myers, Mohanty & Allen, 
2012, p. 327).  Hull (2018, p. 16) also describes arbitrage as a situation that involves 
riskless profit by entering two or more markets at the same time. 
Some of the derivatives and other hedge-fund relative trades are performed in 
exchange traded markets, but countless of trades take place in OTC (over the counter) 
markets. Usually, the counterparts trading in OTC- markets are either banks, fund 
managers, corporations, and other extensive financial institutions. What makes OTC- 
derivative markets stressful is their lack of regulation, and this is one of the main 
causes of the credit crisis that started in 2007 (Hull, 2018, p. 3). In order to give some 
insight about the magnitude and size of OTC- markets in comparison to ordinary 
exchange-traded markets, in December 2015, the size of the over-the-counter market 
was $492.9 trillion and during the same time, the size of exchange-traded markets was 
only $63.3 trillion. (Hull, 2018, p. 5.) 
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In order to explain long and short positions, one must first define what a forward 
contract is. Forward contracts are a quite simple form of derivatives. Basically, a 
forward contract is an agreement to buy or sell an asset for a certain price at some 
future time. Forward contracts are usually traded between two financial institutions in 
the previously mentioned over-the-counter markets. The usual situation in a forward 
contract is for one party of the contract to have a long position and agree to purchase 
an underlying asset at a certain price on a certain date. The counterpart in this scenario 
has a short position, which means that it agrees to sell the asset at a certain price on a 
certain date. (Hull, 2018, p. 6). Future contracts are often defined as a zero-sum game, 
as one’s gains net out their counterpart’s losses, meaning that every short position is 
balanced by a long position. (Bodie et al., 2014, p. 772.) 
According to Hull (2018, p. 108), short selling refers to a situation in which assets are 
not owned but are sold anyway. To illustrate this, here is a certain situation in which 
an investor decides to short a company X by 10 units. The broker of the deal borrows 
the stocks from an entity Y (also paying some fee for borrowing the assets) and sells 
them in the market normally. Later on, the position is closed, and the same investor 
purchases these 10 units of the same stock X from the markets. These “new” stocks 
are then used to replace the ones that were borrowed from entity Y. The investor could 
either earn a profit in this situation if the value of the stock has declined or lose the 
value of the investment if the stock value has gone up. Therefore, shorting implies that 
an investor expects investment objects to lessen in value. (Hull 2018. p. 108). 
Furthermore, Bodie et al. (2014, p. 772) describe short selling and long-position 
buying as figurative, since the contract itself is not actually sold or bought like a stock 
or a bond would be. Long and short positions are somewhat mutual agreements when 
at the time of contract, no money changes hands.  
In the scenario described above, payoffs are explained as follows. In a forward 
contract, the payoffs from a long position on an asset are the difference between the 
delivery price 𝐾 and the spot price of the asset in the end of the contract 𝑆𝜏.  
                       𝑃 = 𝑆𝜏 − 𝐾                                                                                                        (6) 
42 
In this case, the holder of the long contract is obligated to buy the asset that is worth 
𝑆𝜏 for the price of 𝐾. On the other hand, in a short position, the forward contract owner 
has a payoff resulting from the subtraction of the spot price of the asset 𝑆𝜏. from the 
delivery price 𝐾. 
                       𝑃 = 𝐾 − 𝑆𝜏                                                                                                 (7) 
Payoffs from short and long positions can be negative or positive. These positions are 
illustrated in the following figure number 1, where the delivery price is K and the price 
of asset at maturity is St. In theory, a long position enables a situation in which the 
maximal loss of a position is limited to the price of the option, but the possible gains 
are limitless. Conversely, a short position provides unlimited losses and limited gains. 
(Hull, 2018, p. 7). 
 
Figure 3. Payoffs of forward contracts (a) short position and (b) long position (adapted from 
Hull, 2018, p. 7). 
Forward options include mainly two types of options: puts and calls. A put option 
enables the holder of the option to sell an asset or a security at certain price by a certain 
date, whereas a call option refers to a situation in which the holder has the right to buy 
an asset or a security at a certain date for a certain price. (Hull, 2018, p. 19). 
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Options are usually described as either European or American. American options can 
be exercised whenever until the expiration date of the option, while European options, 
which are more widely used, are only exercised on the expiration date. The purchaser 
of a call option will be hoping that the asset’s value increases, whereas the purchaser 
of a put option will hope for a diminishing value of an asset. (Hull, 2018, pp. 209–
210.) 
 
Figure 4. Payoffs of European options (adapted from Hull, 2018, pp. 210-211). 
The European call option as displayed in figure 2, can be exercised only on the 
expiration date. If the underlying stock price (Sp) on this expiration date is under $10 
the investor does not choose to exercise the option and will lose its initial investment 
of $5 for purchasing the option. If the price is over $10, it will be exercised, and the 
profit is as high as it climbs. As mentioned previously, call option buyers hope that the 
stock price increases, and they earn profits. On the other hand, buyers of put options 
are hoping that the stock price will plummet as they earn profits when the stock price 
(Sp) falls under $10. If the stock price does not fall under $10, the option is yet again 




4.2 Macro and managed futures funds 
Macro and managed funds invest at the macro level implying the vast scope in this 
particular fund. These funds commonly manage long and short positions all over the 
global equity, currency, fixed income, and commodity markets. This particular fund 
exploits using futures, swaps, and forwards in its investment strategies. Since this 
strategy of macro and managed futures funds focuses on derivatives markets, they 
typically own highly liquid holdings which allows them for quick liquidation of 
holdings in the cases of market crisis. Leverage in macro and managed funds comes 
as well from derivatives markets, which lessens the probability for counterparty risk. 
(Chambers et al., 2018, p. 29.)  
According to Hull (2018, p. 20), a derivate can be described as a financial instrument 
whose value derives from the values of other underlying, perhaps more primitive 
variables. Usually, the variables defining the value of a derivate are the prices of assets 
such as in stock option. In stock option, the value of derivates originates from the value 
of a stock that the option is combined with. Nonetheless, derivatives can be combined 
and dependent on nearly any kind of variables or investment objects. (Hull, 2018, p. 
20.) 
Chambers et al. (2018, p. 29) show that when investors are allocating their funds 
between different hedge fund strategies, they should take liquidity and common 
performance into consideration during times when markets are in crisis. In this sense, 
what makes macro and managed funds attractive is their tendency to preserve or even 
increase in value during times of crisis, while other strategies tend to witness losses. 
Fung and Hsieh (2004) also point out that trend-following strategies tend to blossom 
when traditional assets are falling in value, which could provide a fruitful source of 
diversification inside a portfolio with traditional assets. 
Macro and managed future funds are similar in the way that they take positions in 
derivatives markets and operate on a macro level. What makes them distinct from each 
other are the facts that macro funds are usually anticipatory, discretionary, and 
concentrated, and that they use mainly fundamental analysis, whereas managed future 
funds are often referred to as trend followers or CTAs (commodity trading advisers) 
45 
that are more reactive, diversified, systematic and take advantage of technical analysis. 
(Chambers et al., 2018, p.  29.) 
According to Chambers et al. (2018, p. 30), macro and managed funds often attempt 
to gain prosperity from forecasting international money flows across different asset 
divisions that may cause markets to form extensive directional moves. Global macro 
funds tend to use fundamental analysis of market conditions to anticipate these moves. 
Often, managers of global macro funds have some background in macroeconomics 
and therefore know to analyze how the behavior of for instance central banks may 
influence currency and sovereign debt markets. Usually, macro hedge fund managers 
seek trades in which they may witness large hypothetical gains with decreased 
potential losses. To illustrate this, one commonly used trade among macro managers 
is shorting a currency that is fixed to a rate that macro funds managers consider to be 
too high compared to another currency, and therefore is expected to be devalued.   
Khandani and Lo (2007) label this certain strategy as “Global macro”. Within global 
macro hedge fund- strategy, the managers tend to carry long and short positions in the 
global extensive derivative or capital markets. The positions of managers mirror their 
perceptions of the overall global market movements that are mainly affected by large 
trends or events in the markets. Global macro hedge funds can for example include 
bonds, stocks, commodities and currencies. What makes these funds “global” is the 
fact that they invest internationally in emerging and developed markets.  
4.2.1 Managed futures funds or CTAs 
Chambers et al. (2018, p. 31) show that managed-future funds usually follow trends in 
order to seek long positions when the fund manager is anticipating that prices are 
trending higher, and to seek short positions when lower prices are anticipated. The 
trading systems of managed future funds are often mostly built by using historical data 
and the human emotions of greed and fear, which might have an effect on markets. 
These systems basically determine which markets to sell and which to buy by 
comparing the current market price patterns and the profitable historical patterns. 
Bodie et al. (2014, p. 928) further explain managed future funds as a strategy that uses 
technical trading rules. Chambers et al. (2018, p. 31) add that the investments in assets 
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of managed future funds usually consist of two-thirds in equity index, interest rate, 
currency derivates and fixed income, and one-third in agricultural commodity 
derivates, metals and energy. If we consider the history of managed future funds, they 
have even experienced gains during the market crisis of 2008. Fung and Hsieh (2004) 
state that similarly to option buyers, managed future funds tend to gain in value when 
markets are volatile. Jeanneret, Monnin and Scholz (2010) add that when investing in 
CTAs (Commodity Trade Advisors) alternatively to traditional long-only investment 
objects, investors tend to gain superior returns and downside safety. 
The biggest concern or risk inside managed future funds is the possibility that markets 
are not behaving the way they did in the past or are not trending. Moreover, the risk of 
including computer-based funds is that many similar funds might be using similar 
systems, which might therefore create crowded trades and distorted market prices. 
Computer-based trading strategies might also act in unexpected ways and generate 
rapid losses. (Chambers et al., 2018, p. 31.) 
4.3 Event-driven hedge funds  
As the name might imply, event-driven hedge funds pursue trades in securities of 
certain companies that are expected to experience dramatic developments during the 
advent months. The main focus of these funds lies on mergers, situations of distressed 
debt, and spinoffs or other changes that might alter the equity or debt architecture of a 
certain firm (Fung & Hsieh 1999). Typically, event-driven funds profit when the 
anticipated event occurs as expected. Event-driven managers can focus on a single 
investment strategy, but many combine the following strategies into an individual 
fund. The main justification for combining the strategies is that many event-driven 
opportunities are countercyclical, that is, moving in different directions than their 
corresponding strategies. (Chambers et al., 2018, p. 31.) 
According to (Khandani & Lo, 2007), event-driven strategy is defined as a strategy 
investing in special situations.  This strategy is designed to abduct the benefits from 
price movements that are generated by pending corporate events.  Corporate situations 
which can benefit from event-driven strategy from are corporate restructurings, 
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mergers, acquisitions, liquidations of companies and bankruptcies (Bodie et al., 2014, 
p. 928.) 
Merger arbitrage activism is often at its greatest when strong equity markets have 
strong implications and many possible mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, 
for instance, fund managers of distressed debt hedge funds do better when markets are 
facing turmoil and downturns, since more companies default on their debt obligations 
as a result of the decline in economic conditions. When a hedge fund manager invests 
in numerous different event-driven strategies, the fund is likely be less volatile and the 
returns are higher, since the level of diversification of the investments is improved. 
(Chambers et al., 2018, p. 33.) 
4.3.1 Merger arbitrage 
According to Fung and Hsieh (2004), merger arbitrage can also be defined as risk 
arbitrage. In this specific strategy, investors simultaneously invest in each company 
involved within the merger or acquisition. A typical situation in this strategy is to have 
a long position in the stock of the acquired company, and a short position in a stock of 
the company that is acquiring the first company. Within this strategy, the main risk 
emerges from deal risk, which implies the possible scenario of a merger-contract not 
getting fulfilled as expected. (Khandani & Lo, 2007.) 
Fung and Hsieh (1999) show that in a merger arbitrage, funds typically aim to take a 
long position inside the equities of the target firm and a short position in the acquiring 
firm, usually after the possible acquisition of two companies is announced. 
Occasionally, this situation is reversed if the hedge fund managers anticipate that the 
merger deal might fail. The biggest risk within this strategy lies in a situation in which 
the announced merger is not fulfilled (for instance when regulators or managers do not 
accept the terms of a merger). The potential decline is also considerably huge if the 
anticipated merger is not fulfilled, and it often leads to a vast decline in the share price 
of the target firm. Performing this particular fund-strategy depends a lot on the fund 
managers’ ability to forecast the potential mergers and typically, merger-arbitrage 
funds are blooming when the overall market conditions are healthy and the merger 
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activity level is high. Therefore, this strategy does not do well in the event of financial 
crises. (Chambers et al., 2018, pp. 31–32.) 
4.3.2 Activist-, and distressed hedge funds 
Activism among investing generally means seeking opportunities to influence the 
results of an investment. Activist hedge funds can for instance promote an agenda that 
might result in changes in the manner this hypothetical firm is managed, such as 
changes in the composition of the board or in the capital structures of this firm. 
Activism can be categorized as friendly or hostile. Friendly activism includes for 
instance working exclusively with corporate management, and hostile activism usually 
means publishing an own agenda about the company or openly criticizing the board of 
a company about the way they are managing it. Activist hedge funds tend to contain 
highly concentrated portfolios that are often less hedged against market risk 
(systematic risk). The largest risks when considering investments in activist-hedge 
funds are the failure of the activist to make positive changes in the object firm and the 
declining equity markets. (Chambers et al., 2018, p. 32.) 
Distressed hedge funds aim to invest in securities or corporate bonds of a firm that has 
announced bankruptcy or is prone to experience a rapid decline of financial 
performance (Fung & Hsieh 1999).  Investments in securities of distressed firms are 
very complex and illiquid. Distressed hedge fund managers tend to have a financial 
background which helps them estimate more accurately the recovery value of a firm 
and its assets. To illustrate distressed strategies more thoroughly, some funds invest in 
long-only positions in different debt securities, while others may employ capital 
structure arbitrage, in which managers buy one security and short sell another security 
inside of the same firm. Distressed hedge-fund investments include numerous risks 
such as illiquidity, the complex nature of the securities of defaulting firms, credit risk 
and dropping values of firms issuing securities. (Chambers et al., 2018, pp. 32–33.) 
According to Khandani and Lo (2007), the managers of distressed hedge fund 
strategies invest in debt/equity or trade requests of companies that are in financial 
distress or in bankruptcy. Typically, companies that are in major difficulty and have 
needs to revive their financial balance, such as in cases of bankruptcy, trade their assets 
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with great discounts. Hedge fund managers might perceive this as a possibility to turn 
over the assets bought cheaply. 
4.4 Relative value funds  
Relative-value hedge funds target the convergence in the prices of comparable or 
related securities. As with event-driven funds, relative-value funds can also lose 
money quicker than they generate it. Convergence strategies usually benefit in stable 
market conditions, especially when volatility is declining, and credit spreads are 
tightening. On the other hand, in the case of market turbulence, relative value funds 
may experience extreme losses. When the event of a market crisis not considered in 
successfulness of this strategy, relative-value funds generate significant profits and 
low volatility. (Chambers et al., pp. 33–34.)  
Relative-value funds usually include one of the following strategies or a combination 
of them: fixed-income arbitrage, convertible-bond arbitrage, volatility arbitrage or 
relative-value multi-strategy, which is the combination of strategies. Usually, relative-
value funds trade by applying multi-strategy preferences rather than only focusing on 
one specific strategy (Chambers et al., 2018, p. 35). 
4.4.1 Convertible arbitrage 
According to Khandani and Lo (2007), convertible-arbitrage strategy can be identified 
as an investment in the company’s convertible security. Bodie et al. (2014, p. 928) also 
explain that this strategy is typically achieved by holding the convertible bond as a 
long position and the common stock of the company as a short position. Profits within 
this strategy are gained through fixed-income securities and short sales of stock. 
Agarwal, Fung, Loon and Naik (2011) show that even though the popularity of 
convertible-arbitrage (CA) hedge funds has rapidly increased, according to TASS 
Asset Flow Report, the overall coverage of assets employed across all hedge fund 
strategies between 1993 and 2007 was merely around 4,51%.   
For instance, a convertible bond might offer the possibility to gain interest and 
principal payments or the possibility to change bonds to stocks, by for example paying 
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10$ per share. For illustrational purposes, let´s assume that the stock value stays under 
10$ per share, in which case investors would rather receive coupon-payments and the 
principal payment. If the stock tops the price of 10$ per share at maturity, investors 
will probably select to receive the shares rather than the face value of debt. In this 
situation, investors pay for this option by accepting lower bond yields for their 
investments. (Chambers et al., 2018, p. 35). 
According to Chambers et al. (2018, p. 34), convertible bonds are often very complex 
and illiquid, especially when the bond in question is puttable, callable or has some 
mandatory conversion characteristics. Given this perception of complicity and 
illiquidity in convertible bonds, there are higher possibilities for mispricing, which 
then opens possibilities for arbitrage. As explained before, convertible-arbitrage hedge 
funds usually try to find cases in which the embedded equity-option seems to be 
underpriced. In this case, the hedge fund purchases the convertible bond and at the 
same time short sells the underlying stock of an amount particular to hedge against the 
risk of underlying movements of stock price. The risks involved with convertible 
arbitrage strategy are first of all model risk, in which the valuation and hedging models 
do not accurately reflect the valuation or the risks of the underlying securities and 
strategy, and second of all, the risk involved with using leverage, as convertible-bond 
hedge funds are highly leveraged. (Chambers et al., 2018, p. 34). Agarwal et al. (2011) 
show as well that convertible-arbitrage strategies are sensitive to times when markets 
are in turmoil, such as in the case of the LTCM (long-term capital management) crisis 
in 1998. 
4.4.2 Volatility arbitrage 
Volatility-based hedge fund strategies concentrate on changes in volatilities and the 
difference between expected- and realized volatilities. Volatility-based strategies 
mainly focus on equity-price volatilities and apply futures contracts and exchange-
traded products on this implied volatility. Volatility-arbitrage hedge funds aim to profit 
when options are possibly mispriced in relation to each other, or when these options 
are mispriced in relation to movements in the underlying securities. Most hedge fund 
managers aim to purchase underpriced options, sell options that are overpriced and, by 
combining these two elementary strategies, earn superior profits. Simultaneously, 
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hedge fund managers hedge the option positions by offsetting the positions in the 
assets that are underlying the options. Another common trade in this strategy is one 
called the “dispersion trade”, in which the goal is to offset the position in equity-index 
options by using options of stocks within that same index. Volatility arbitrage 
introduces a feature called “correlation trading”, in which the hedge fund takes long 
positions in options of individual stocks and short options in indices, which enables 
them to profit when the correlation of these two diminishes. Volatility-based hedge 
funds mainly display large gains when markets are in crisis but gravitate low returns 
or even losses during times when markets are quiet. (Chambers et al., 2018, pp. 34–
35.) 
4.4.3 Fixed-income arbitrage and relative value multistrategy 
Fixed-income arbitrage attempts to profit from changes over time in the yield 
relationships of investment objects. In this strategy, a fund manager obtains offsetting 
short and long positions in for instance any fixed-income securities, derivatives 
including investment-grade and high yield bonds, sovereign debt, MBS, credit default 
swaps and securities filled with assets (Chambers et al., p. 35). Consequently, fixed-
income arbitrage strategy aims to profit from anomalies between interest-rate 
securities that are related to each other (Khandani & Lo, 2007). In order to illustrate 
fixed-income arbitrage strategy, Bodie et al. (2014, p. 928) mention that interest-rate 
swaps are often used, as for example between U.S. and non-U.S. government bond 
arbitrages. 
Fixed-income arbitrage strategy can be viewed as simple but also, on some occasions, 
riskier than others. The simple aspect might include offsetting long and short positions 
in a sovereign yield curve. A riskier example of fixed-income arbitrage strategy would 
be to carry a trade where the investor or hedge fund manager invests in high-yielding 
securities and uses for instance derivates and sovereign debt in order to hedge the 
interest rate risk. In consideration of crisis behavior, this strategy tends to be fruitful 
when market conditions are normal and credit spreads are in stable conditions. If credit 
spreads increase rapidly, the damage to the hedge fund value can be significant, since 
this strategy uses a lot of leverage and the costs of financing might increase. (Chambers 
et al., 2018, p. 35.) 
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According to Chambers et al. (2018, p. 35), relative-value multistrategy funds can 
invest in a broad selection of relative-value trades, including convertible bond 
arbitrage, fixed income arbitrage, and volatility arbitrage. Many of the relative-value 
hedge funds trade using a multistrategy rather than focusing only on one. Khandani 
and Lo (2007) mention that in the context of the beginning of the global financial crisis 
in 2007 relative-value strategies displayed that many existing measuring methods for 
estimating risks, such as illiquidity and volatility risk were not adequate for this certain 
strategy. 
4.5 Equity hedge funds 
Bodie et al. (2014, p. 928) argue that depending on the market perceptions, equity-
oriented positions are usually on either side of the market (short or long) and are not 
meant to be market neutral. These funds may take concentrated, industrial, or regional 
focuses in order to establish equity/short positions in the markets. 
Hedge fund managers attempt to sell overvalued short stocks while simultaneously 
trying to obtain long positions in shares or stocks they believe are cheap or 
undervalued. What mainly differentiates equity hedge fund strategies from each other 
is their net market exposure. Long-short funds are typically net long, market-neutral 
funds are usually entirely hedged against market movements, and short-selling funds 
are net-short, which implies that they behave comparably well when markets are 
declining (conversely to net-long funds which operate well when markets are 
climbing). What needs to be taken into consideration within this strategy is the fund’s 
beta risk, as the investor might have some other investments that correlate highly with 
the investment objects within this strategy. Equity hedge fund managers usually use 
either a quantitative approach or a fundamental stock-choosing one. Fundamental 
managers thoroughly research the company and its assets or profitability, and usually 
maintain a quite narrow number of positions. On the other hand, quantitative managers 
will pursue a more diversified portfolio including many positions. (Chambers et al., 
2018, p. 35.) 
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4.5.1 Long-Short equity funds 
According to Chambers et al. (2018, p. 36), long-short equity funds are rather more 
long-position balanced than short, and they can be referred to as Equity Long Biased 
hedge funds. In an ideal situation, the manager of an Equity Long Biased hedge fund 
adds alpha from both long and short stock choices, and when investors assess the 
funds, they should assess the manager’s skills by their choices of short and long 
securities. Long positions are typically held over a longer period of time, and their 
potential gain is usually much higher than their potential loss, since the only possible 
loss of money is the initial investment, but the investment or stocks value can climb as 
high as possible. Short positions work in the opposite way. (Chambers et al., 2018, pp. 
35–36.) 
The hedge fund strategy described as “balanced between stocks and bonds” is a 
subtype of net-long exposure hedge funds. The goal of this strategy is to limit the 
volatility of the overall hedge fund portfolio by taking advantages through 
diversification, by blending asset classes with low cross-correlations. (BarclayHedge, 
2020). 
According to Joenväärä, Kosowski and Tolonen (2012), Long/Short strategies are the 
largest hedge fund style in common databases: for HFR, it represents 29,8% of the 
total funds, for TASS 35,6%, for Morningstar 32,5%, for BarclayHedge 20,8% and for 
EurekaHedge 29,8%. Long/short equity fund- strategies include investments in equity 
while using both long and short investments in the markets. The objective within this 
strategy is to avoid holding market-neutral positions, and the managers of the funds 
require the skills to make shifts in their holdings, from long to short or from large to 
small capitalization of stocks. Hedging within this strategy is usually managed through 
futures and options. (Khandani & Lo, 2007.) 
4.5.2 Short-selling equity funds 
According to Bodie et al. (2014, p. 928), short-selling equity hedge funds are often 
described as a dedicated short bias within hedge fund databases. Short-selling equity 
funds can target a portfolio that focuses on short selling or target a long-short position 
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that is net-short of 50%. Short equity fund managing and maintaining can be rather 
challenging, as markets in a normal situation tend to climb in value, and this particular 
fund should be used in a portfolio to hedge against long stock positions. What makes 
short-selling equity hedge funds tempting is the tendency for the competition of long 
trades and short trades to be asymmetric. Stocks are mainly held long, and there are 
less than 10% of shares held short. This implies that many investors seek to buy or 
invest in long positions of undervalued stocks, but fewer investors seek to sell short, 
overvalued ones. This reduced competition might in theory provide increased alpha 
for the hedge fund managers that are short sellers. (Chambers et al., 2018, p. 37.)  
4.5.3 Sector hedge funds 
Sector hedge funds concentrate their investments in a specific sector of the economy 
rather than in a particular investment object. Hedge fund managers using this strategy 
rely on their thorough knowledge of an industry combined with their connections 
within that industry. Sector hedge-fund style is often described as a risk-seeking 
strategy with a great potentiality for sizable profits. (Fung & Hsieh 1999.) According 
to BarclayHedge (2020), sector-specific hedge funds include sectors such as 
environment, energy, farming, health, mining, natural resources, real estate, and 
technology. 
4.5.4 Emerging markets hedge fund  
The Emerging markets- hedge fund strategy mainly involves equity or fixed-income 
investments towards emerging markets globally. Investing in emerging markets is 
often managed through long-only investment strategies, since it is quite common that 
emerging markets do not enable short selling or offer any other possible derivative 
products that a hedge fund could hedge upon. Unfortunately, since investments within 
this strategy are prone to long-only investments, it is vulnerable to movements caused 
by financial crises. (Khandani & Lo, 2007). 
Hull (2018, p. 12) further explains that the hedge fund strategies for emerging markets 
typically invest in debt and/or equity inside companies originating from developing 
countries. Bodie et al. (2014, p. 928) add that typically, the goal within this strategy is 
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to take advantage of the market inefficiencies within emerging markets. This particular 
strategy usually pursues long-only investments, since short-selling is not achievable in 
most emerging markets. 
According to Aggarwal and Jorion (2010), emerging markets- hedge fund managers 
have very strong financial motives to add value for investments performance, and since 
their size is often much smaller than already established traditional hedge funds, they 
are consequently more agile. Even when hedge fund- related biases are taken into 
consideration, emerging markets- hedge fund strategies seem to show strong 
exceeding performance in the beginning of their existence.  
Jiang and Kelly (2012) show that a good way for new and young emerging markets 
hedge funds to establish returns is to take on investments that are tilted towards tail-
risk, as they tend to carry a high compensation for risk. Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) 
also clarify that the first two years of existence within emerging markets- hedge funds- 
strategy especially tend to establish create opportunities for investments. Also, what 
might make this strategy attractive is its tendency to be open to new investors as well, 
unlike older hedge funds.  
4.6 Market neutral hedge fund strategies 
Market-neutral equity hedge funds stabilize the risk and size of their long positions by 
the risk and size of their short positions. This way, the hedge fund aims to operate in a 
situation of zero beta and zero directional exposure to stock markets. As is typical for 
all equity hedge funds, this particular strategy relies mostly on the manager’s ability 
to choose an investment object, as the hypothetical return of the fund is entirely made 
from their skills for selecting stock. (Chambers et al., 2018, p. 37.) 
According to Khandani and Lo (2007), the equity market-neutral hedge fund strategy 
aims to take advantage of equity market inefficiencies. Bodie et al. (2014, p. 928) also 
argue that the exploitations of these market inefficiencies are usually managed through 
the control of for instance industries, sectors, size, and other exposures in the markets. 
Usually, this strategy involves equal-sized simultaneous long and short positions 
within matching equities. Market-neutral equity hedge funds are designed to be 
56 
currency and, - or beta neutral, with the tendency to include plenty of leverage in order 
to enhance possible returns. (Khandani & Lo, 2007.) 
According to Patton (2009), hedge funds are usually categorized according to their 
investment strategies or styles. The equity market-neutral hedge fund strategy is one 
of the largest strategies among hedge funds, since about 20% of all hedge fund 
strategies are covered with market-neutral styles. The goal of market-neutral hedge 
fund styles is to “neutralize” market risks by taking differing short and long positions 
in securities that are related.  Neutrality within hedge funds is often based on 
correlation or market-beta, implying the uncorrelation of possible generated returns, 
for instance with some market index. Therefore, one of the main attractions in market-
neutral hedge fund styles is their independence between the fund and the market. 
4.7 Fund of Funds 
The “Fund of funds” hedge fund strategy invests in other hedge funds. According to 
Bodie et al. (2014, p. 946), the main idea within Fund of funds is to distribute the risk 
between several different hedge funds. Chambers et al. (2018, p. 43) argue that 
investing in FoFs includes many positive and negative aspects. One positive aspect of 
FoFs is their accessibility to even small investors that do not have the knowledge, the 
time or the typically huge minimal investment required by other hedge funds to gain a 
profound level of diversification in hedge funds. The mitigated effort for necessary 
due diligence is therefore the most notable benefit within this strategy. In addition, 
FoFs tends to include many large-scale benefits, such as their superior negotiating 
abilities for fee construction and liquidity terms. 
Bodie et al. (2014, p. 944) show that the main downside with the FoFs strategy is the 
option-like compensation of their fees, as the incentive fee is paid to each underlying 
fund that outperforms its benchmark. Fees are even paid when the accumulated 
performance of the fund of funds is not superior to the aggregate performance. 
Chambers et al. (2018, p. 43) add that even when Fof´s fees are subtracted, these 
particular funds tend to underperform direct hedge fund investments. 
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4.8 Proportion of hedge fund strategies in databases 
In this thesis, hedge fund categorization is established according to the proposition 
made by Joenväärä et al. (2012) as follows. 12 main categories of upper hedge fund 
strategies are examined in this thesis: Event Driven, CTA, Global Macro, Emerging 
Markets, Long/Short, Market Neutral, Long Only, Multi-Strategy, Short Bias, Relative 
value, Sector and Others. In addition to these, 5 subcategories of strategies are 
introduced in the data-sample of this thesis. Figure 5 displays the proportions of these 
hedge fund strategies in five different databases at end of 2011 and according to 
Joenväärä et al. (2012). The data is gathered from the following databases: Hedge Fund 
Research (HFR), Lipper TASS, BarclayHedge, EurekaHedge and Morningstar. 
Joenväärä et al. (2012) show that there are differences in the data base’s assets under 
management, coverage in returns and in the amount of defunct funds per database.  For 
instance, the number of hedge funds across different databases ranges from 7,502 
(Morningstar) to 10,520 units (BarclayHedge), and TASS, HFR and BarclayHedge 
contain more obsolete funds than alive funds, which suggests strong biases of 
backfilling and survivorship. The following figure displays the hedge fund strategies 
in detail.  
 
Figure 5. Proportion of different hedge fund strategies (adapted from Joenväärä et al. 2012). 
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5 EMPIRICAL DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Description of Data 
This chapter will present an analysis of the overall data regarding hedge funds and of 
the data used within this study. The data is collected from BarclayHedge over the 
period from January 1997 to November 2020. BarclayHedge is an enterprise 
specialized in providing reliable information as well as data regarding the performance 
and other vital characteristics of hedge funds, and it is considered as one of the most 
prominent sources for conducting research about hedge funds. The data in the 
BarclayHedge database is formulated by using hedge fund indices that include several 
different individual hedge funds in order to capture the real essence of hedge fund- 
related features. Monthly returns of indices only include returns of funds that report 
their data monthly.  
The BarclayHedge database for hedge fund indices includes the 18 different main 
allocations for hedge fund strategy indices that should be included whenever 
conducting studies about hedge funds: Barclay Hedge Fund, Balanced (Stocks & 
Bonds), Convertible Arbitrage, Distressed Securities, Emerging Markets, Equity Long 
Bias, Equity Long/Short, Equity Market Neutral, European Equities, Event Driven, 
Fixed Income Arbitrage, Fund of Funds, Global Macro, Merger Arbitrage, Multi 
strategy, CTA /Managed Futures, Option strategies and others. The Barclay Hedge 
Fund- index combines all the hedge fund indexes included in the data sample, since it 
includes 2933 different funds with different categorizations as of in the end of 3rd 
Quarter of 2020. The hedge fund indices described as “others” include a combination 
of smaller categories of different hedge fund indices that are not accepted as part of 
the multi-strategy subcategory. Other strategies included in this data sample are 
described in full detail in chapter 4. 
The data of the 18 different strategies of hedge fund indices includes the monthly net-
of-fee returns between January 1997 and November 2020. The timeframe is that 
extensive in order to capture as many financial crises affecting hedge fund 
performance as possible. In this study, the three Fama/French Factors (FF3) are 
employed for estimating and evaluating the market returns simultaneously during the 
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period of 1997 – 2020. The Fama/French factors "𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓" as the excess return on 
the market, represents the value-weight return calculated from commonly known 
CRSP firms. These firms are incorporated in the United States and listed on the 
AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE minus the one-month U.S government Treasury bill rate 
as a representative of the risk-free return available in the market. Hence 𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓 
gives a great and reliable benchmark for comparing different hedge fund return in the 
U.S market between 1997 and 2020. (French, 2020).  
As previously mentioned in this thesis, regulatory requirements for hedge funds are 
different from the ones faced by mutual funds and other investment vehicles. What 
makes hedge fund- related data even more difficult to analyse is the fact that databases 
and hedge fund- related data are often provided voluntarily by the funds themselves, 
which, in some cases, render them questionable. Therefore, the question about the 
rationale for an inadequately performing hedge fund to report its data to the public 
should be addressed before examining hedge funds or their data. 
According to Agarwal, Fos and Jiang (2013), hedge funds have vastly liberated 
themselves from the regulations normally faced by great financial institutions such as 
mutual funds and banks by raising capital through private placement. Due to their light 
regulation, hedge funds are not enforced to report their information or data about their 
strategies, performance and characteristics to any database or authorities. This makes 
hedge funds the least transparent participants in the markets. Liang and Park (2010) 
add that defining hedge fund failures is difficult since gaining detailed information 
about defunct or dead hedge funds is challenging. 
According to Agarwal et al. (2013), the reporting tendencies of hedge funds should be 
defined as a cost-benefit trade-off. In some cases, reporting can be fruitful, and in 
others, it is more costly than beneficial. When a new hedge fund is emerging in the 
markets, listing it in a database can improve a fund´s availability for new investors. 
On the other hand, the main cost and downside of reporting originates from a partial 
loss of that hedge fund’s privacy and secrets. From a hedge fund’s point of view, the 
least favorable situation would be to continue reporting commitment and revealing 
information a fixed time period during fixed intervals, which would dispose the hedge 
fund’s ability to operate in a flexible manner almost entirely. (Agarwal et al., 2013.) 
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5.2 Hedge fund data biases 
Hedge fund databases are commonly known to include several biases. Chambers et al. 
(2018, p. 46) show that many database- related biases within hedge funds usually 
appear to decrease the risks of investing in hedge funds or to increase the potential 
gains. According to Fung and Hsieh (2000), it is well known that hedge fund- related 
databases contain numerous biases and that the information on hedge funds is not 
easily accessible. These biases are mainly caused by the previously mentioned 
deficiencies in requirements for disclosure, as hedge funds have the ability to choose 
whether they report their return characteristics to the databases or not. Hedge funds are 
defined as private investment vehicles and therefore simply are not required to disclose 
their data.  
Hedge fund biases can be categorized as natural or spurious biases. Spurious biases 
are mainly created by using statistical means to bypass data deficiencies, and natural 
biases emerge from hedge funds- related natural birth, prosperities, and deaths (Fung 
& Hsieh, 2000). Titman and Tiu (2011) suggest that the most notable hedge-fund 
related- biases are survivorship bias, self-selection bias and backfilling bias.  
5.2.1 Survivorship bias 
Fung and Hsieh (2000) show that survivorship bias is the difference in performance 
between the observable funds and the surviving ones. Chambers et al. (2018, p. 47.) 
argue that when liquidated hedge funds are compared with the ones that are still 
reporting to databases, the liquidated ones are assumed to have higher risks and a lower 
return. Since many hedge funds have a lifespan of three to five years, the survivorship 
bias poses a significant issue. On the other hand, Feffer and Kundro (2003) argue that 
the failure of a hedge fund should be separated from nonobligatory fund liquidations, 
since they are more frequent and are usually driven by the hedge fund manager’s 
market expectations. Feffer and Kundro (2003) define failing hedge funds as those that 
have been forced to discontinue investment operations due to reasons outside the hedge 
fund management´s jurisdiction. Joenväärä et al. (2012) add that remarkable 
differences in survivorship bias among different databases influence the average 
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performance of funds, since the funds surviving among databases tend to include 
greater returns than the defunct ones do. 
Ibbotson et al. (2011) also explain that failed funds are usually deleted from databases.  
The difference between surviving and obsolete funds can be interpreted from the way 
they report their returns. As databases only include information from funds that do 
report it, these funds are described as the ones surviving. Obsolete funds might have 
stopped reporting their data to databases for numerous reasons, such as liquidations, 
mergers, poor performance, bankruptcies or for voluntary reasons. If the funds become 
defunct or obsolete from the database due to poor performance, the performance of the 
surviving funds is heavily biased upwards, and the typical experience from investing 
in hedge funds gains an extra positive, biased, and false output. (Fung & Hsieh, 2000.) 
Fung and Hsieh (2000) show that according to the TASS database, 60% of the 602 
defunct hedge funds were liquidated, 28% were obsolete because their managers had 
stopped reporting the return characteristics, 4% were merged and 8% were defunct for 
undisclosed reasons. Defunct funds performed worse than the ones categorized as the 
surviving ones, and the liquidated funds had substantially lower return characteristics 
than other defunct funds. Liang (2000) continues by studying the existence and the 
magnitude of survivorship bias for hedge funds in the TASS and HFR databases.  
According to this study, the annual survivorship bias of hedge funds averages a bit 
over 2%, a result consistent with the findings made by Fung and Hsieh (1998).   
Fung and Hsieh (2009) point out that earlier studies about the magnitude of hedge fund 
biases could be faulty or misleading since many performance measurements of biases 
might be affected by two errors. The first error refers to the situation in which hedge 
funds migrate from one database to another and the second error occurs if are databases 
merged together. According to Titman and Tiu (2011), the survivorship bias was a 
major issue within the data gained before 1994 since databases simply discarded the 
funds that had discontinued reporting their information. In order to mitigate the 
survivorship bias, the term “graveyard sample” was included in hedge fund databases 
after 1994. This sample included the prior returns of funds that had ceased reporting. 
On the other hand, Liang and Park (2010) argue that on average, liquidated hedge 
funds tend to have lower downside risks than the median hedge funds in the graveyard 
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sample. Liang and Park (2010) add that simpler measurements, such as a change in a 
fund’s size and performance provide more value to define the failure of a hedge fund 
than the reasons provided by data vendors do. 
5.2.2 Backfilling or instant history bias 
When hedge fund- related returns are first reported to a database, the years prior to the 
reporting are all added at once, while the later records of the fund are reported in real 
time, for instance monthly. A common aspect of returns is the tendency for the live 
monthly records of the funds to appear unimpressive compared to the returns initially 
reported (Chambers et al., 2018, p. 47). Titman and Tiu (2011) argue as well that since 
backfilling the historical data of a hedge fund is not compulsory when they enter a 
database, this may cause an upward bias in the characteristics of the reported return, 
as there is no motive for a fund to backfill its performance if it has been lousy. In order 
to mitigate this issue, Titman and Tiu (2011) recommend eliminating from the data-
history the first 27 months of all the funds that are prone to backfilling biases. Problems 
related to backfilling-bias seem particularly strong if a manager of many hedge funds 
is able to launch them simultaneously and then only reports the returns of the funds 
that were successful. The results provided by Titman and Tiu (2011) are consistent 
with the study made by Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov (2010) in which the 
recommended optimal number of months to be excluded from the database is 25. 
According to Fung and Hsieh (2004), when funds enter a database, their prior history 
is affixed and many funds with a good track record enter a database in order to seek 
new potential investors and advertise themselves legally by doing so. Fung and Hsieh 
(2000) point out that funds with an only favorable past performance and managers with 
a good performance record have incentives to report to a database. On the other hand, 
funds suffering losses will have no incentive to report their poor track records to a 
database. Joenväärä et al. (2012) argue that the difference in backfilling bias among 
databases influences the persistence of hedge funds performance since incompetent 
obsolete funds tend to underperform. 
Posthuma & Van der Sluis and Pieter Jelle, (2003) show in their study that the average 
length of instant histories is actually 37 months, which is considerably longer than the 
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estimates from other above-mentioned researchers. In addition to this and according 
to Posthuma et al. (2003), over 50% of all returns inside the TASS database are 
backfilled. When comparing the different strategies, Fund of funds, which is often 
described as the most bias-free, witnessed a backfilling bias of 2,27% per annum. If 
these 50% of backfilled returns are omitted from the data, only five hedge fund 
strategies were able to deliver positive returns in the time period from 1996 to 2002: 
convertible arbitrage- strategy 3,5%, long or short equity hedge 2,9%, event driven 
5,5% and equity market neutral strategy 3,6%. (Posthuma et al., 2003.) 
5.2.3 Multi-period sampling bias 
According to Fung and Hsieh (2004), various hedge funds include differences in 
sampling. For instance, when TASS and HFR databases are compared, the former has 
396 funds that are not within the other databases and the latter 446. Fung and Hsieh 
(2000) define multi-period sampling bias as the result of the requirement for a 
sampling period, according to which hedge funds should have a sufficient history 
before being included in a study. For example, an indicative period of time for the 
returns data of a hedge fund to become suitable to be studied or after to be invested in 
could be 24-months to 36-months. This implication can be difficult in some situations, 
for instance when considering the many emerging and new funds which do not have a 
track record of 24 to 36 months: excluding them from the dataset could make it faulty. 
Fung and Hsieh (2000) report that a multi-period sampling bias is actually relatively 
small, as the required 36-months of minimum history generates a 0,6% of chance in 
results. 
5.2.4 Misreported returns bias 
Bollen and Pool (2009) show that many hedge funds are more likely to report 
extremely small gains than small losses, which could lead them to report every positive 
movement in the data that is above zero. This suggests an intentional distortion of 
returns on the managers’ part, meaning that they purposely avoid reporting any small 
losses. The distortion prompted by the discontinuity in reporting returns is instant in 
defunct and in existing funds, which suggests that this bias is not a feature of the 
survivorship bias.  
64 
An alternative explanation for the discontinuity in reporting returns is that managers 
might simply be overly optimistic in regard to the valuations of the illiquid investments 
occupied in their portfolios. For example, the previously mentioned hedge-fund 
strategy that specializes in investing in distressed securities shows more discontinuity 
in reporting than other strategies. If hedge-fund returns are actually distorted, and 
managers purposely only report positive returns to hide losses, investors may 
underestimate possible losses of investments and grossly underestimate the efficiency 
of hedge fund managers. In these cases, investors should be careful when assessing 
hedge fund performance metrics based on prior positive returns, as they might be 
unreliable. (Bollen and Pool, 2009). 
5.2.5 Self-reporting and smoothed returns bias  
A self-reporting is one that originates from the option hedge funds have to stay 
unreported to any database or to only report occasionally. The common reasons for 
hedge funds to do so are that they are being liquidated and closed for new investments. 
A self-reporting bias can possibly affect any study of hedge fund performance and risk 
aspects. (Agarwal, Fos & Jiang, 2013.) 
Titman and Tiu (2011) show that when reporting the results is voluntary, failing hedge 
funds have no reasons to report. When a fund is excellent, it closes fast and has no 
reasons to advertise by reporting its characteristics. Agarwal et al. (2010) additionally 
examine this bias by stating that the performances of non-reporting and reporting 
hedge funds do not actually differ significantly, but that the funds which report seem 
to experience losses in performance between the beginning and the end of the reporting 
period. Titman and Tiu (2011) show that many hedge funds display a positive 
correlation which is connected to smoothed returns within hedge funds. In the case 
that returns are indeed smoothed, their Sharpe as well as their information ratios will 
be yet again biased upwards, which can be interpreted as the smoothed returns- bias. 
5.2.6 Biases related to fund of funds 
Fung and Hsieh (2000) argue that one way to mitigate many data biases is to use the 
return data from Fund of hedge funds, or FoF, since it is less prone to include database- 
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related biases. Fung and Hsieh (2000) also note that when a fund that FoF has invested 
in has gone defunct, its past performance is still included in the FoF, which then 
mitigates the survivorship bias. In addition to this, if a fund that is part of FoF does not 
report to any database, the performance is still compared to the overall performance of 
FoF. Fung and Hsieh (2004) point out that when Fund of Funds invests into a certain 
hedge fund, the history of that hedge fund is not included into the history of the entire 
FoFs´ returns, which therefore restricts the possibility for backfilling returns and for 
an instant history bias. 
5.3 Other hedge fund indices related issues 
According to Fung and Hsieh (2004), another deficiency in hedge fund indices, both 
fund of hedge funds and in individual funds, is that decent hedge fund-related data 
usually starts after the 90s. As the 90s were merely bullish markets except for few 
years of market recession, the data related to hedge funds returns do not give a 
sufficiently long history to determine whether returns were a sign of hedge funds 
performance or overall market conditions. 
Fung and Hsieh (2004) also mention the disadvantage of the hedge fund indexes 
lacking transparency. As previously mentioned, hedge funds are defined as private 
investment vehicles and therefore their requirements for disclosure are not transparent. 
This factor makes analyzing hedge fund characteristics even more difficult, as the only 
data available is the one they decide to report into a database. In addition to this, the 
usual benchmarks or various ways to examine portfolio success do not apply well to 
hedge funds. Equally weighted index returns do not apply, since the distribution of 
assets in hedge funds is skewed in favor of the top funds, meaning that under 25% of 
all hedge funds manage over 75% of the entire hedge fund industry. Equally weighted 
indices also tend to be biased towards newly added funds amid which the backfilling 
bias is strong. Fung and Hsieh (2004) add that using AUM (asset under management) 
as weights for hedge fund indexes may cause problems. Using AUM as weights will 
more likely bias index returns towards less-leveraged managers and aggravate asset-
gatherers. 
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5.3.1 Mitigating Biases 
Fung and Hsieh (2000) argue that mitigating the backfilling bias of a hedge fund is 
possible by deleting some amount of the fund’s initial returns from the data. According 
to their estimates, mitigating can be achieved by estimating the incubation period, i.e., 
the lag between the initiation date and the date the hedge fund enters into a certain 
database. The average incubation period is estimated to be 343 days; therefore, Fung 
and Hsieh recommend deleting the first 12 months of a hedge fund’s returns from the 
data sample. In this study, the original data of many hedge fund strategies begins in 
1994, but the initial 36 monthly returns are left out for each of them, as suggested by 
Posthuma et al. (2003). Therefore, the data sample used within this study starts from 
1997. According to Joenväärä, Kaupila, Kosowski and Tolonen (2019), research 
regarding hedge funds should include the post- 1994 data in order to mitigate 
survivorship bias. 
5.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 displays the summary statistics of monthly returns for 18 different hedge fund 
strategies during the sample period of January 1997 – November 2020. Most strategies 
have the entire sample of 287 months between 1997 and 2020, but Balanced and 
Option strategy funds have less, due to these funds being listed afterwards.  The 
statistics from table 1 show superior returns for all hedge fund strategies during the 
previously mentioned sample period.  
The mean measures the average monthly returns of hedge funds and the standard 
deviation represents the dispersion in values. During this time sample, the highest 
monthly average returns are generated by Equity Long Bias funds while the lowest are 
generated by CTA hedge funds, Funds of Funds, Market Neutral and Balanced hedge 
funds. Standard deviation is highest for the Emerging Markets funds and lowest for 
the Market Neutral funds. On the other hand, the highest AUM, when excluding the 
Barclay Hedge fund index since it represents the combined data of the whole hedge 
fund industries, is in Fixed Income Arbitrage funds and lowest AUM is in Distressed 
hedge funds. Hedge funds pursuing the Convertible Arbitrage strategies only take a 
small part of the entire sample as they only represent 14 of the 2553 funds, whereas 
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the Fixed Income strategies have the most operating funds, in the amount of 514. The 
lowest monthly returns among these 18 hedge fund strategy indices are in Market 
Neutral funds with the possible loss of -0.029, whereas the greatest losses during this 
time sample are in the Emerging markets funds (-0.194). The highest positive returns 
during the time sample between 1997 and 2020 are presented by Emerging Markets, 
European Equities and hedge funds categorized as others. 
Kurtosis measures the likelihood of extreme values on both sides of the mean value. It 
demonstrates the probability of extreme low or high values; hence investors usually 
prefer negative or low kurtosis (Bodie et al. 2014, p. 1052). In table 1, Fixed Income 
Arbitrage and Convertible Arbitrage funds have high kurtosis values (45.4 and 22.7) 
which indicate the unpredictability of these returns between 1997 and 2020. The 
lowest kurtosis, with quantities ranging from 1.009 to 2.102 is in the CTA, Global 
Macro and Equity Long Bias funds, which indicates to some extent a predictability in 
returns.  
Skewness is a measure of asymmetry in the probability of distribution of the returns 
(Bodie et al. 2014, p. 1057). Positive skewness shows that a superior quantity of 
returns, in this particular occasion monthly returns, is positive. Vice versa, if skewness 
is negative, it indicates that a relatively superior share of returns is negative. From 
table 1 we can analyze that positive skewness is found in Long/Short, Market Neutral, 
European Equities, CTA and Other strategies and that the highest level of negative 
skewness is among Fixed Income Arbitrage, Convertible Arbitrage and Multi Strategy 







Table 1. Summary statistics of hedge fund strategies monthly returns, number of funds and AUM. 




















          
Mean 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.007 
Median 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.007 
Std. dev. 0.021 0.019 0.017 0.020 0.039 0.033 0.020 0.009 0.022 
Var 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Kurtosis 4.127 5.064 22.658 3.880 3.801 2.102 4.744 1.578 8.611 
Skewness -0.775 -0.941 -2.733 -1.269 -0.769 -0.634 0.722 0.101 1.593 
Min -0.092 -0.095 -0.138 -0.088 -0.194 -0.135 -0.069 -0.029 -0.060 
Max 0.077 0.063 0.071 0.056 0.145 0.100 0.110 0.031 0.140 
Count 287 143 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 
N 2933 103 14 21 386 411 295 92 81 
AUM 3379.6 475.2 22.7 18.3 263.3 325.6 170 60.7 184.6 



















          
Mean 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.007 
Median 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.008 
Std. dev. 0.021 0.013 0.016 0.016 0.011 0.013 0.023 0.014 0.025 
Var 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Kurtosis 8.992 45.345 5.239 1.547 13.004 12.322 1.009 6.343 6.522 
Skewness -1.564 -4.907 -0.929 0.667 -1.735 -2.283 0.372 -1.518 1.083 
Min -0.131 -0.136 -0.073 -0.036 -0.078 -0.076 -0.070 -0.073 -0.071 
Max 0.063 0.042 0.061 0.075 0.050 0.039 0.098 0.045 0.158 
Count 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 227 287 
N 22 514 126 45 157 20 64 25 177 
AUM 769.8 274.2 179.9 80.8 347.5 285.5 303.6 37.7 71.3 
                    
This table exhibits the summary statistics of 18 different hedge fund strategies monthly returns over the sample 
period of January 1997 until December 2020. The rows under hedge fund strategies represent the average monthly 
returns for each hedge fund strategy. Penultimate row displays the number of different funds included within the 




Figure 6. AUM of hedge fund industry. 
Figure 6 exhibits the AUM (assets under management) annual average of the hedge 
fund industry in $ billions USD, according to BarclayHedge. The time sample in this 
particular figure is between January 2000 and November 2020, since unfortunately the 
BarclayHedge database does not provide data regarding AUM before the year 2000. 
The AUM average is calculated from numbers reported quarterly, because only using 
end-of-year AUM could lead to a downward bias of the valuation. When we analyze 
figure 6, we can notice a significant drop between 2007 and 2009 which is a clear 
indicator of a financial crisis during that time period. In particular, the average AUM 
dropped from $2006,3 billion to $1347,7 billion between 2007 and 2009. In figure 6 
we can also study the fact that the growth of AUM has been less abrupt after 2009, 
indicating the possibility that many funds have gone defunct, have stopped reporting, 
have gone bankrupt or have been liquidated.  
In addition, years 2019 and 2020 show diminishing values in the average AUM, 
implying the possible effects of the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic. In the year 2020, 
the total annual average of the entire hedge fund industry is $3116,4 billion whereas 
in the beginning of the time sample in 2000 it was merely $237,7 billion, giving a great 









2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
AUM annual average in $ billions of USD 
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Table 2. Annualized returns of hedge fund strategies and market. 





































1997 0.223  0.157 0.173 0.266 0.227 0.261 0.164 0.268 0.246 0.145 0.177 0.196 0.140 0.172 0.109  0.063 0.312 
1998 0.082  0.062 -0.019 -0.274 0.144 0.184 0.106 0.268 0.030 0.008 0.041 0.127 0.096 0.094 0.132  0.185 0.243 
1999 0.366  0.139 0.206 0.591 0.430 0.467 0.115 0.424 0.273 0.153 0.269 0.202 0.174 0.216 0.016  0.692 0.252 
2000 0.122  0.153 0.053 -0.043 0.037 0.164 0.126 0.207 0.121 0.118 0.102 0.119 0.193 0.217 0.066  0.106 -0.117 
2001 0.068  0.166 0.171 0.149 0.055 0.049 0.055 0.046 0.083 0.061 0.044 0.063 0.031 0.105 0.038  -0.018 -0.114 
2002 0.014  0.106 0.064 0.051 -0.055 -0.018 0.054 0.015 -0.028 0.071 0.018 0.071 -0.001 0.063 0.137 0.126 -0.079 -0.211 
2003 0.180  0.098 0.256 0.354 0.302 0.158 0.041 0.116 0.220 0.100 0.104 0.180 0.084 0.117 0.155 0.128 0.189 0.318 
2004 0.088  0.010 0.184 0.150 0.133 0.066 0.038 0.092 0.161 0.071 0.067 0.029 0.052 0.063 0.009 0.070 0.043 0.119 
2005 0.107  -0.032 0.079 0.221 0.123 0.115 0.062 0.141 0.082 0.047 0.069 0.094 0.054 0.064 0.028 0.096 0.067 0.061 
2006 0.124  0.117 0.147 0.219 0.147 0.080 0.047 0.134 0.156 0.061 0.094 0.078 0.140 0.139 0.056 0.123 0.070 0.154 
2007 0.102  0.027 0.069 0.236 0.106 0.079 0.046 0.074 0.084 -0.006 0.089 0.114 0.140 0.096 0.076 0.150 0.072 0.057 
2008 -0.216  -0.277 -0.317 -0.395 -0.290 -0.119 -0.011 -0.092 -0.175 -0.252 -0.222 -0.007 -0.034 -0.180 0.136 -0.014 -0.108 -0.367 
2009 0.237 0.126 0.536 0.309 0.433 0.294 0.144 -0.004 0.166 0.291 0.198 0.102 0.075 0.117 0.258 -0.048 0.142 0.192 0.283 
2010 0.109 0.074 0.122 0.140 0.123 0.142 0.073 0.036 0.069 0.100 0.117 0.049 0.067 0.061 0.108 0.064 0.088 0.111 0.175 
2011 -0.055 -0.088 0.001 -0.054 -0.137 -0.090 -0.046 0.002 -0.064 -0.037 0.045 -0.062 -0.037 0.038 -0.023 -0.042 0.050 -0.018 0.005 
2012 0.083 0.069 0.087 0.122 0.103 0.094 0.064 0.019 0.097 0.085 0.093 0.047 0.026 0.038 0.058 -0.018 0.049 0.064 0.163 
2013 0.111 0.109 0.081 0.168 0.026 0.214 0.139 0.086 0.131 0.108 0.087 0.088 0.048 0.039 0.096 0.008 0.016 0.159 0.352 
2014 0.029 0.047 0.012 0.008 -0.017 0.030 0.029 0.046 0.033 0.006 0.053 0.028 0.039 0.007 0.053 0.123 -0.026 0.067 0.117 
2015 0.000 -0.002 0.003 -0.101 -0.030 -0.011 0.025 0.052 0.052 -0.032 0.027 -0.001 0.023 0.080 0.011 -0.009 0.071 0.057 0.001 
2016 0.061 0.050 0.051 0.144 0.100 0.052 0.018 0.006 -0.041 0.116 0.056 -0.005 0.017 0.064 0.046 -0.044 0.005 0.014 0.135 
2017 0.103 0.076 0.026 0.042 0.186 0.140 0.083 0.029 0.083 0.081 0.040 0.060 0.040 0.050 0.059 -0.008 0.077 0.151 0.223 
2018 -0.052 -0.060 0.000 0.003 -0.109 -0.088 -0.030 -0.017 -0.031 -0.027 0.004 -0.048 -0.053 0.003 -0.049 -0.046 -0.040 -0.046 -0.051 
2019 0.106 0.122 0.084 0.023 0.127 0.153 0.066 -0.006 0.087 0.076 0.024 0.070 0.078 0.064 0.052 0.067 0.126 0.127 0.304 
2020 0.074 0.045 0.113 0.098 0.094 0.108 0.056 -0.019 0.018 0.068 0.096 0.066 0.059 0.054 0.020 0.007 0.070 0.166 0.186 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 2 displays hedge fund strategies annualized equally weighted returns between 1997 and 2020.
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Table 2 displays the annualized returns of all 18-hedge fund strategical allocations and 
market returns from 1997 to 2020. From the table, we can observe that a few funds 
present particularly volatile returns. The returns of Emerging Markets funds range 
from -39.55% to + 59.11% of annual returns during the time sample of 1997 – 2020, 
implying a vast total volatility, a fact also supported by the results found in table 1. 
Additionally, Market returns, Convertible Arbitrage, Equity Long Bias and Others- 
categorized strategies also present great amounts of volatility in annual returns. The 
least fluctuating returns are displayed by Market Neutral funds, and the findings from 
table 1 showing the standard deviations for this strategy support this fact as well. The 
highest annualized returns during this time sample are presented by an asset bucket 
labeled as Others (+69.16%, year 1999) and by the Convertible Arbitrage funds 
(+53.62%, year 2009). On the other hand, the lowest annualized returns are displayed 
by the Emerging Markets hedge funds (-39.55%, year 2008 and -27.43%, year 1998) 
which supports the implications regarding financial crises during these years. The 
strategies defined as Option- and Balanced Strategies started reporting after the 
beginning of the time sample in table 2, respectively in 2002 and 2009, hence the blank 
spaces. 
 
Figure 7. Annual returns of hedge fund strategies and the market. 
Figure 7 displays results from table 2 in a simple but informative figure. Annualized 
hedge fund strategies return data is formatted into a figure, which displays annual 
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returns as percentages between January 1997 and November 2020. We can see from 
the figure that previously mentioned Emerging Markets hedge funds have been 
oscillating a lot during times of financial crises. Fixed income and Convertible 
arbitrage funds show similar movements which are consistent with the findings 
presented in table 1. Other hedge fund strategies seem to behave pretty similarly to 
each other during the time sample of 1997 – 2020 but there are also some clear 
indications of strategies not following overall market conditions. For instance, 
investigated from figure 7, CTA hedge funds (yellow line) seem to obtain profits 
during major financial crises such as in 1999, 2001, and 2008. Similar results, that are 
not as much affected by the overall market conditions and crises are displayed by 
Market Neutral and Merger Arbitrage strategies. These results are consistent with the 
summary statistics provided in table 1. Figure 7 supports well the definitions for crisis 
periods (1998, 2001, 2008, and 2020), given that the general movement during those 
periods is for most hedge fund strategies annualized returns to diminish. 
5.5 Research Methods 
The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the performance of different hedge fund 
strategies in comparison with market returns during financial crises and during 
comparison periods. The main findings of this study aim to answer the question of 
whether some hedge fund strategies perform better than others during crises, since the 
descriptions of many of strategies claim a better operation during market crises than 
during tranquillity periods. The performance analysis of hedge fund strategies is 
conducted during different financial crises affecting hedge funds, such as in 1998, 
2001, 2008 and 2020. According to Jiang and Kelly (2012), the most important crisis, 
described as the LTCM- crisis, starts in August 1998 and ends in December 1998. The 
second and third crises in 2001 and 2008 are defined by National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER, 2021). The crisis of 2001 starts in March and ends in November of 
that same year, and the financial crisis of 2008 starts in December 2007 and ends in 
June 2009. The latest crisis used in this study concerns the global pandemic of COVID-
19. According to Ding et al. (2020) the first signs of a market recession begin in 
December 2019, therefore the time between December 2019 and the end of the time 
sample in November 2020 is considered as a crisis period. 
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The comparison period for analyzing hedge fund performance is between 1997 and 
2020, excluding the periods of crisis.  This period is relatively long timewise in order 
to capture bearish, average, and bullish market circumstances. As mentioned in chapter 
2.6, investors investing in hedge funds try to obtain as much excess alpha as possible. 
Alpha being a measure of excess return, it is often used as one of the main measures 
for examining hedge funds performance over market.  On the other hand, beta is used 
in this context to examine how susceptible the investment returns of a hedge fund are 
against the returns of the whole market. The model used within this study to examine 
the overall returns of hedge fund strategies compared to the market returns is a single 
index model, the Capital Asset Prising Model. CAPM was introduced by Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner (1965) as follows: 
𝑅ℎ,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                                (8) 
Where  𝑅ℎ,𝑡  portrays pure return on a hedge fund with a particular strategy ℎ, 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 
constitutes as the risk-free return and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 represents return on the market on month 𝑡 
which in this study is defined by previously mentioned FF3 Factors (from FF3 
excluded SMB and HML). In addition, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 represent the intercept of regression 
as 𝛼𝑖 is alpha and 𝛽𝑖 is beta, while 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term on month 𝑡. As a proxy for the 
risk-free rate of returns, this study uses commonly known one-month U.S government 
T-bill rate, which is also included in the description provided by Fama/French Factors. 
The CAPM provides an interesting and effective way to determine the risk associated 
with an investment, as well as the relationship between risks and expected returns. 
Despite the ideal simplicity of the CAPM model, the empirical problems of the 
questionable model may negate its application in practice, as the proper functioning of 
CAPM relies heavily on unrealistic assumptions (Fama & French, 2004). According 
to Black (1972) the relevance of the CAPM to market risk suits better if risky 
investments can be sold short, which is the occasion within hedge funds. 
The second model used in this study to compare returns of hedge fund strategies and 
market returns during tranquillity and crisis periods is an augmented version of CAPM 
with crisis dummy (𝐼𝐶𝑅), and an interaction term between the crisis dummy and the 
market returns: 
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𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝜌𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐶𝑅 + 𝜇𝑖 ∗ [(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) ∗ 𝐼𝐶𝑅 ]            (9) 
Crisis dummy (𝐼𝐶𝑅) gets a value of 0 during normal market conditions and a value of 
1 when markets are facing the various above-mentioned financial crises. One 
important aspect in this study is examining the correlation coefficients of different 
hedge fund strategy returns against market returns during different time-periods. 
Correlation gives a good perspective on the comparability of hedge fund strategies 
during financial crises and periods of tranquility. As mentioned in chapter 3, many 
hedge-fund strategies are defined as gaining alpha when markets are facing difficult 
conditions, therefore one expects the correlation of hedge fund strategy returns and 
market returns to be low or even negative in multiple situations. According to Patton 
(2009), Fung and Hsieh (2001), Agarwal and Naik (2002), the low correlation of hedge 
funds with market returns is one of the oft-cited favorable features of hedge funds. 
Patton (2009) describes the correlation between the investments and the market as 
essential since risk-averse investors prefer a low or even negative correlation than a 
positive correlation.  
The hedge fund movements compared to the market ones can be addressed as well by 
calculating the adjusted R-squared (𝑅2𝑎𝑑𝑗), which should be low in order to support 
the hypothesis of this study that some hedge funds are doing better than others when 
market conditions are falling. The adjusted R-squared is used in order to mitigate the 
possible errors provided by normal R-squared measures, as they tend to get higher 
when more explanatory variables are introduced in the regression models. According 
to Titman and Tiu (2011), a low 𝑅2 could be an indicator of managerial success and 
skill combined with possible signs of market neutrality. In addition to the use of 
measures such as alpha, beta, R-squared, correlation, kurtosis and skewness, hedge 
fund returns are evaluated by conducting an analysis of the statistical significance of 
p-values at a 0.95 confidence level. Even though these calculations can easily be 
executed and are commonly used, the reliability of the results they provide when 
evaluating hedge fund- related performance are often vague, due to the dynamic 
trading strategies of hedge funds and their mysterious way of operating amongst 
financial markets.  
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6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1 Overall benchmarking of hedge funds  
This section presents the performance of hedge fund strategies during the overall 
period from January 1997 until November 2020. Data used within these results are 
gained from BarclayHedge, and consist of bearish, bullish, and normal market 
conditions as there are no months of distinctive behavior omitted from the employed 
sample. Returns of 17 individual hedge fund strategies and one main Barclay Hedge 
fund index are proxied against market returns provided from the set of FF3 factors 
(French, 2020). As the FF3 factors normally include other measurements such as SMB 
(Small Minus Big) and HML (High Minus Low) as well, only estimators for market 
returns (Rm- Rf) are used from the set of factors. To mitigate the possible 
consequences of back-filling bias, as suggested by Posthuma et al. (2003), 36 monthly 
returns are omitted from the scope of this study, as the original data for most of the 
hedge fund strategies would have begun in 1994. 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of 17 different hedge fund indices, the Barclay 
Hedge fund index and the market returns established by using monthly returns during 
the time period from 1997 until 2020. Most sample periods include a total of 287 
months, but Option and Balanced (Stocks & Bonds) hedge fund strategies report 
respectively 227 and 143 months, as the former fund was established in 2002 and the 
latter in 2009.  Surprisingly, the highest average monthly mean among these objects is 
displayed by Market returns (0.008) and the second highest by the Equity Long Bias 
(0.0075) hedge fund. The lowest monthly means during this time period are exhibited 
by CTA hedge funds (0.0035) as well as by Market Neutral hedge funds (0.0036). The 
standard deviation is upmost in Market returns and Emerging Markets hedge funds 
while the smallest variation in monthly returns is displayed by Market Neutral hedge 
funds. A high amount of kurtosis, which indicates the unpredictability of the returns, 
is indicated within Fixed Income (45.35), - and Convertible Arbitrage (22.66) hedge 
funds while the lowest kurtosis is indicated within the CTA hedge fund strategies 
(1.01) and Market returns (1.082). In addition to kurtosis, the lowest skewness (-4.91) 
is sustained by the Fixed Income Arbitrage hedge fund, showing the returns of this 
strategy are more negative than positive. 
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Table 3. Summary statistics of hedge fund strategies and market returns during overall period. 
Hedge Fund strategies and Market 
    
Barclay 
Hedge 

















           
Mean  0.007 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.007 
Median  0.007 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.007 
Std. dev.  0.021 0.019 0.017 0.020 0.039 0.033 0.020 0.009 0.022 
Var  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Kurtosis  4.127 5.064 22.658 3.880 3.801 2.102 4.744 1.578 8.611 
Skewness  -0.775 -0.941 -2.733 -1.269 -0.769 -0.634 0.722 0.101 1.593 
Min  -0.092 -0.095 -0.138 -0.088 -0.194 -0.135 -0.069 -0.029 -0.060 
Max  0.077 0.063 0.071 0.056 0.145 0.100 0.110 0.031 0.140 
Count  287 143 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 



















           
Mean 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.008 
Median 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.014 
Std. dev. 0.021 0.013 0.016 0.016 0.011 0.013 0.023 0.014 0.025 0.046 
Var 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 
Kurtosis 8.992 45.345 5.239 1.547 13.004 12.322 1.009 6.343 6.522 1.082 
Skewness -1.564 -4.907 -0.929 0.667 -1.735 -2.283 0.372 -1.518 1.083 -0.604 
Min -0.131 -0.136 -0.073 -0.036 -0.078 -0.076 -0.070 -0.073 -0.071 -0.172 
Max 0.063 0.042 0.061 0.075 0.050 0.039 0.098 0.045 0.158 0.137 
Count 287 287 287 287 287 287 287 227 287 287 
                      
This table exhibits the summary statistics of hedge fund strategies monthly returns over the sample period of 
January 1997 until December 2020. The rows under hedge fund strategies represent the average monthly returns 
for each hedge fund strategy. The penultimate row displays the number of total months of reported activity among 
hedge fund strategies as reported by BarclayHedge. 
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6.1.1 Alpha during overall time periods 
Table 4 displays the monthly alphas of the hedge fund strategies over the market 
returns during the period from 1997 until 2020. The alpha estimates are calculated by 
utilizing CAPM as a standard OLS with time series regression, as explained in 
equation 8. If a hedge fund strategy obtains positive alpha values according to table 4, 
it has outperformed the market returns. In addition, if these alpha p-values are not 
statistically significant (p-value > 0.05), it indicates that even though alpha might be 
greater compared to the market returns, it is not statistically significant. The lowest 
and only negative alpha values are displayed by the Balanced- hedge fund strategy, 
but these results are statistically insignificant with the 0.95 confidence level. As these 
results might be biased due to this strategy being established later than 1997, as in 
2009, when omitting Balanced hedge fund strategy, the worst alphas over market 
returns are generated by Fund of Funds and Market Neutral hedge funds. Taking into 
consideration the possibility that returns increase according to possible additions in 
risks, according to table 3, the Market Neutral hedge funds seem to have less volatility 
in returns, which also explains the possible low alpha generated in table 4. The highest 
excess return over market returns (alpha) is produced by European Equities and Option 
strategies hedge funds. However, as explained in chapter 5.2, hedge funds are prone 
towards several biases, which might alter the reliability of the results exhibited above. 
Table 4. Hedge fund alpha of monthly returns. 




















          
Alpha 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 
P-value 0.000 0.193 0.001 0.005 0.387 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 



















          
Alpha 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 
P-value 0.000 0.003 0.220 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.002 
                    
          
This table presents the average monthly alphas of different hedge fund strategies during whole sample period as 
well as the p-value for the alpha. Alpha is calculated by utilizing CAPM as defined in equation 8.  
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6.1.2 Beta coefficient and correlation during overall period 
Table 5 presents the results concerning the neutrality of different hedge fund strategies 
during the overall time period from 1997 until 2020. Measurements such as Beta 
coefficient estimates, R-squared a correlation are obtained by using CAPM through 
OLS regression. These factors measure the relationship of hedge fund strategies 
against market returns during bullish, bearish, and normal market conditions. Lower 
beta values indicate that the returns of these particular hedge fund strategies are not 
highly correlated with market returns during this time period, whereas negative Beta 
values would indicate the sensitiveness between market returns and hedge fund 
strategies as being opposite. P-values display answers as to whether the results are 
statistically significant at 0.95 confidence level (P-value < 0.05). In addition to these 
factors, the adjusted R-squared results are also presented in table 6, which should 
support the findings made when evaluating the beta-coefficients.  
All hedge fund strategies except for CTAs seem to obtain statistically significant p-
values at a 0.95 confidence level during the time period from 1997 to 2020. The 
negative coefficient beta of CTA hedge funds implies that the returns of this hedge 
fund have been moving in the opposite direction when compared against market 
returns. The highest beta value is obtained in this case by Equity Long Bias- hedge 
funds (0.65) and by Emerging Markets (0.61), which is consistent with the investment 
practices of these hedge funds, as explained in chapter 4. Adjusted R-square measures 
the neutrality of variables as well. According to Titman and Tiu (2001), low levels of 
adjusted R-squared suggest a market neutrality combined with managerial skills. The 
lowest amounts of adjusted R-squared are exhibited by the CTA (0.003) and the 
Market Neutral (0.045) hedge funds, while the uppermost degrees are displayed by the 




Table 5. Hedge funds neutrality measures during overall time period. 




















          
Beta 0.375 0.370 0.178 0.272 0.610 0.650 0.328 0.039 0.273 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.712 0.741 0.230 0.385 0.517 0.833 0.591 0.045 0.322 
          
















          
Beta 0.340 0.115 0.236 0.184 0.139 0.175 -0.041 0.132 0.390 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.159 0.000 0.000 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.591 0.156 0.499 0.283 0.342 0.380 0.003 0.161 0.538 
                    
          
This table presents the coefficient beta, p-value of beta, and adjusted R-squared measures for different hedge fund 
strategies during the overall time period between January 1997 and November 2020. These measures are obtained 
by utilizing CAPM. 
Table 6 displays the correlation coefficient between different hedge fund strategies and 
market returns during the overall time period. P-value of correlation measures whether 
the results are statistically significant at a 0.95 confidence level or not. All strategies 
except for CTA hedge funds present statistically significant P-values with a 0.95 
confidence level, which is also consistent with the previous findings. The uppermost 
level of correlation is indicated by Equity Long Bias- hedge fund indices (0.91) and 
Balanced hedge funds (0.86), which is also consistent with the findings made regarding 
R-squared measures in table 6. On the other hand, the minimal correlation (when 
excluding CTA hedge funds) is shown by Market Neutral hedge funds, which is also 





Table 6. Correlation of hedge funds and market returns. 





















         
Correlation 0.839 0.862 0.478 0.619 0.719 0.912 0.762 0.207 0.565 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 



















          
Correlation 0.765 0.392 0.698 0.527 0.572 0.606 -0.085 0.399 0.732 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.149 0.000 0.000 
                    
          
This table presents the correlation and p-value of correlation between market returns and hedge fund strategies 
amongst 1997 and 2020. 
6.2 Benchmarking Hedge Funds during the financial crises 
This section presents the performance of hedge fund strategies during the financial 
crisis periods of 1998, 2001, 2008 and 2020. The first crisis, or LTCM- crisis took 
place between 08/1998 and 12/1998 (Jiang and Kelly, 2012), and the following one 
occurred between 03/2001 and 11/2001 (NBER, 2021). The following financial crisis 
was the longest, lasting from 12/2007 to 06/2009 (NBER, 2021). The latest crisis 
included in the dataset was triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic and occurred 
between 12/2019 and 11/2020 (Ding et al. 2019). Therefore, the maximum number of 
months in the data sample during the different financial crises is 47. The returns of 17 
individual hedge fund strategies and of the Barclay Hedge fund index are proxied 
against the market returns provided according to FF3 factors (French, 2020). The 
original data for most of the hedge fund strategies begins in 1994 but in order to 
mitigate the possible consequences of a back-filling bias, the 36 first monthly returns 
are omitted from the scope of this study, as suggested by Posthuma et al. (2003). 
Table 7 displays the summary statistics of the monthly returns on 17 different hedge 
fund indices, on the Barclay Hedge fund index and the return on the market during 
several financial crises. Most sample periods include the total of 47 comparative crisis 
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months, but Option and Balanced (Stocks & Bonds) hedge fund strategies report 31 
and 18 months due to these funds being established in 2002 and 2009. The average 
monthly return of the market during this combined crisis period a negative -0.1 %, 
implying that the overall market returns have been falling. During these financial 
crises, Distressed securities (-0.4%), Fixed Income Arbitrage (-0.3%), Fund of Funds 
(-0.3%) and Emerging Markets (-0.5%) present negative monthly average returns. 
Surprisingly, the rest of the hedge fund strategies in question are able to generate 
profits despite falling market conditions. The most average monthly means are 
generated by the Option Strategies (+0.6%), Others (+0.6%), CTA (+0.5%), and 
Balanced (+0.5%) funds. 
From table 7, we can observe some interesting implications about standard deviation, 
since Market returns have the highest standard deviation of all the hedge fund 
strategies in the data sample. Another interesting finding is that Market Neutral hedge 
funds present the lowest standard deviation while the Emerging Markets hedge funds 
display a high amount of standard deviation even during financial crises, which is 
consistent with the findings presented in table 1. The highest kurtosis is presented by 
Fixed Income Arbitrage- hedge funds, and the lowest by market returns. In addition, 
the skewness is also the most negative amongst the Fixed Income Arbitrage funds, 
suggesting that relatively most share of returns displayed are negative. Even though 
all the skewness factors presented in table 7 are negative, the lowest amount of 







Table 7. Summary statistics of hedge funds and market monthly returns during financial crises. 
Hedge fund strategies 
    
Barclay 
Hedge 
















           
Mean  0.001 0.005 0.003 -0.004 -0.005 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 
Median  0.004 0.008 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 
Std. dev.  0.033 0.037 0.034 0.033 0.062 0.052 0.026 0.012 0.023 
Var  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Kurtosis  1.331 2.268 6.423 0.634 1.393 0.454 0.754 0.257 0.313 
Skewness  -0.975 -0.972 -2.082 -0.798 -0.900 -0.692 -0.689 -0.097 -0.500 
Min  -0.092 -0.095 -0.138 -0.088 -0.194 -0.135 -0.069 -0.029 -0.060 
Max  0.058 0.063 0.057 0.056 0.111 0.100 0.046 0.029 0.047 
Count  47 18 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 



















           
Mean 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.006 -0.001 
Median 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.012 0.012 0.004 
Std. dev. 0.035 0.027 0.025 0.017 0.021 0.024 0.025 0.021 0.031 0.073 
Var 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.005 
Kurtosis 4.500 12.335 1.873 -0.109 4.931 4.051 0.935 6.227 -0.163 -0.424 
Skewness -1.515 -2.982 -1.264 -0.046 -1.375 -1.792 -0.137 -2.252 -0.192 -0.351 
Min -0.131 -0.136 -0.073 -0.033 -0.078 -0.076 -0.070 -0.073 -0.071 -0.172 
Max 0.063 0.026 0.039 0.038 0.050 0.039 0.055 0.030 0.073 0.137 
Count 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 31 47 47 
                      
           
This table exhibits the summary statistics of hedge fund strategies monthly returns over the sample period of 
January 1997 until December 2020 during several financial (1998, 2001, 2008, and 2020) crises all merged into 
one data sample. The rows under hedge fund strategies represent the average monthly returns for each hedge fund 
strategy. The penultimate row displays the number of total months of financial crises concerning particular hedge 
fund strategies as reported by BarclayHedge. 
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6.2.1 Annualized hedge fund and market returns during financial crises 
Table 8. Annualized hedge fund and market returns during different financial crises. 
Hedge fund strategies and Market 
    
Barclay 
Hedge 
















                     
1998  0.015   0.008 -0.088 -0.205 0.044 0.067 0.052 -0.005 
2001  0.034   0.098 0.107 0.059 0.011 0.018 0.051 0.031 
2008  -0.126 0.024 -0.098 -0.253 -0.253 -0.199 -0.056 -0.011 -0.025 
2020  0.092 0.059 0.120 0.095 0.133 0.126 0.075 -0.020 0.045 
Annualized  0.000 0.021 0.028 -0.047 -0.081 -0.012 0.025 0.018 0.011 
  
 



















                      
1998 -0.047 -0.031 -0.023 0.062 0.043 0.019 0.126   0.108 0.111 
2001 0.033 0.043 0.016 0.052 0.009 0.054 0.010   0.003 -0.070 
2008 -0.064 -0.219 -0.186 0.026 0.024 -0.069 0.098 0.100 -0.009 -0.341 
2020 0.085 0.102 0.079 0.067 0.061 0.031 0.003 0.073 0.182 0.221 
Annualized 0.000 -0.034 -0.034 0.052 0.034 0.008 0.058 0.042 0.068 -0.045 
                      
This table presents annualized average equal-weighted monthly returns for each hedge fund strategy and the market 
returns, which in this case are defined by FF3 factors. Annualized returns are presented of financial crises in 1998, 
2001, 2008, and 2020. Annualized returns are calculated separately for different financial crises along with the 
whole combined financial crisis period in the row “Annualized”. 
Table 8 presents the equal-weighted annualized returns of different hedge fund 
strategies and the market returns during several financial crises as a combined whole 
entity labelled as “Annualized”. The results provided from this table give a good 
perspective of the entire movement experienced by the hedge fund strategies as well 
as by the entire market returns. Consistent with the previous calculations, the returns 
of the Emerging Markets hedge fund strategies have been worst during times of market 
turmoil. In particular, the annualized returns of the combined financial crises show a 
negative -8.1%, as calculated from the entire crisis- data sample of 47 months. Other 
major overall losses are presented by Distressed securities hedge funds (-4.7%) and by 
the overall Market returns (-4.5%). Distinctively terrible losses are experienced by the 
overall market returns during the crises of 2001 (-7.0%) and 2008 (-34.1%). However, 
many of the funds are still able to present positive returns, even during the times of 
financial crises. The utmost superior returns during the combined annualized period 
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are displayed by the Others (+6.8%), CTA´s (+5.8%) and Global Macro (+5.2%) 
hedge funds. Findings from table 8 seem to support the fact that some hedge fund 
strategies do not follow market returns unconditionally and are able to create 
prosperous gains for investors investing in hedge funds. Yet again, it is good to keep 
in mind that these results might be biased upwards due to hedge funds tendency to 
include several data related biases. In addition to excess returns, some hedge fund 
strategies have generated more losses than the Market returns during these financial 
crisis periods. For instance, investing in hedge fund indices following Distressed 
Securities, - or Emerging Markets -strategies would have resulted in increased losses 
during several financial crises. Findings in table 8 about the Distressed Securities 
hedge fund are not aligned with its description, since Chambers et al. (2018, p. 33) 
define this strategy as successful in situations when the markets are facing turmoil and 
downturns. 
6.2.2 Alpha during financial crises 
Table 9 displays hedge fund alphas of monthly returns during financial crisis periods. 
The alpha estimates are calculated by utilizing an augmented version of the CAPM as 
explained in equation 9, in which the alphas represent the distinction between alpha 
values in several crisis periods and normal market conditions. Therefore, if a hedge 
fund strategy obtains positive alpha values in table 9, it has outperformed alphas during 
normal time periods. In addition, if these crisis alpha p-values are not statistically 
significant (p-value > 0.05), it indicates that even though alpha might be greater during 
financial crisis periods than in normal market conditions, the difference between the 
alphas is not statistically significant. 
We can analyze from table 9 that the most positive alpha over non-crisis returns during 
several financial crisis periods is presented by Option Strategies- hedge funds with a 
statistically insignificant p-value. The other positive alpha values listed in table 9 all 
include statistically insignificant p-values, indicating the reality, that even if alpha 
values are greater during financial crises than in normal market conditions, it is 
statistically not significant. On the other hand, the negative alphas displayed for 
instance by Distressed Securities, Fixed Income Arbitrage, and Fund of Funds- hedge 
fund strategies are statistically significant and negative during financial crises periods. 
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Table 9. Hedge fund alpha of monthly returns during financial crisis. 




















          
Alpha 0.000 -0.002 0.002 -0.004 -0.005 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
P-Value 0.076 0.625 0.508 0.001 0.063 0.501 0.461 0.127 0.147 



















          
Alpha 0.000 -0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.006 
P-Value 0.080 0.000 0.002 0.666 0.194 0.009 0.671 0.402 0.266 
                    
          
This table presents the average monthly alphas of different hedge fund strategies during combined financial crisis 
periods. Alpha is calculated by utilizing an augmented version of CAPM as defined in equation 9. 
The findings presented in table 9 seem to be in opposition to the overall perception of 
the performance of hedge funds during periods of financial crisis. Gao et al. (2018) 
state that hedge funds are able to benefit from disastrous market conditions rather than 
be harshly exposed to market risks and overall conditions of the market. This 
assumption does not seem to apply. 
Table 10 presents the results concerning the neutrality of different hedge fund 
strategies during periods of financial crisis by investing measurements such as beta 
estimates, R-squared and correlation. These measurements are obtained by using the 
augmented version of CAPM, as explained in equation 9 and they measure the 
relationship of hedge fund strategies against market returns during times of financial 
crises (1998, 2001, 2008 and 2020) and in normal market conditions. The values 
established from the section “Crisis Beta” represent the difference in beta values 
during normal market conditions and during crisis periods. The lower beta values 
indicate that the returns of hedge fund strategies are not highly correlated with the 
market returns during periods of financial crisis, whereas the negative Beta values 
would indicate a sensitiveness between the market returns and hedge fund strategies 
as opposite. The crisis Beta P-values display answers about whether the results are 
statistically significant at a 0.95 confidence level (P-value < 0.05). In addition to these 
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factors, the adjusted R-squared results are also presented in table 10, which should 
support the findings made when evaluating beta-coefficients.  
The hedge-fund strategies with statistically significant Beta values are: Convertible 
Arbitrage-, Market Neutral-, Event Driven-, Fixed Income Arbitrage-, Global Macro-
, Merger Arbitrage-, Multi Strategy-, Barclay Hege Fund Index and CTA- funds. 
Among these strategies, the highest Crisis- Beta value is displayed by the overall fund, 
Barclay Hedge Fund Index, with a beta value of 0.41. This result is logical since this 
particular fund consists of different funds using distinctive investing strategies. If this 
fund is excluded from the dataset, the highest beta-value is presented by Event Driven- 
hedge funds with a beta value of 0.38. Table 10 also presents one hedge-fund strategy, 
the CTA, with a statistically significant negative beta value of -0.12. The negative beta 
value of CTA hedge fund strategies suggests that the returns of this strategy move in 
different directions when compared to market returns, implicating that when markets 
are negative, this strategy is able to gain positive returns. These results are also 
supported by the findings regarding R-squared measures, since CTA hedge funds have 
the lowest level of 0.013, whereas the highest R-squared levels are displayed by the 
hedge fund strategy Equity Long Bias (0.833). 
Table 10. Hedge funds neutrality measures during financial crises. 




















          
Beta 0.407 0.416 0.267 0.297 0.674 0.675 0.314 0.008 0.236 
P-value 0.046 0.054 0.000 0.196 0.096 0.220 0.507 0.016 0.238 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.591 0.745 0.266 0.408 0.524 0.833 0.589 0.066 0.326 



















          
Beta 0.382 0.158 0.252 0.135 0.222 0.220 -0.116 0.157 0.393 
P-value 0.027 0.009 0.242 0.019 0.000 0.002 0.033 0.356 0.989 
Adj. 𝑅2 0.591 0.212 0.514 0.292 0.424 0.410 0.013 0.160 0.537 
                              
This table presents the coefficient beta, p-value of beta, and adjusted R-squared measures for different hedge fund 
strategies during several combined financial crises included in the time sample between 1997 and 2020. These 
measures are obtained by using the augmented version of CAPM, as described in equation 9. 
87 
Table 11 displays the correlation coefficient between different hedge-fund strategies 
and market returns during the above-mentioned financial crises. The P-value of 
correlation measures whether the results are statistically significant. All strategies, 
except for Market Neutral hedge funds present statistically significant P-values with a 
0.95 confidence level. The uppermost level of correlation is indicated by Equity Long 
Bias- hedge fund indices (0.95), which is also consistent with the findings made 
regarding R-squared measures in table 5. In addition to this, CTA hedge funds present 
a negative correlation of -0.35, which suggests that this strategy is highly uncorrelated 
with the returns exhibited by market returns during financial crises. These results are 
consistent with the findings presented by Chambers et al. (2018, p. 37), as they define 
that CTA strategies have tendencies of low correlation against market returns.  
Table 11. Correlation during financial crises. 





















          
Correlation 0.887 0.893 0.563 0.650 0.796 0.947 0.891 0.038 0.728 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.797 0.000 



















          
Correlation 0.793 0.423 0.744 0.563 0.772 0.658 -0.346 0.554 0.916 
P-Value 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 
                    
This table presents the correlation and p-value of correlation between market returns and hedge fund strategies 
amongst several financial crises between 1997 and 2020. 
6.3 Benchmarking of hedge funds during the comparison period 
The comparison period includes the same data used for calculating the previously 
presented results during several financial crises between January 1997 and November 
2020, with the exception that all the periods of financial crises are omitted from the 
data sample. The cumulated total of months without financial crisis periods during this 
time sample is 240. Table 13 presents the summary statistics of the monthly returns on 
hedge fund strategies during the comparison period between 1997 and 2020. Balanced 
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(Stocks & Bonds) hedge fund strategy only has 125 months in this set and Option 
Strategies only 196, since they were introduced later in this data sample. 
Table 12. Summary statistics of hedge fund strategies returns during the comparison period. 





















           
Mean 
 
0.008 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.009 
Median  0.008 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.006 0.004 0.007 
Std. dev.  0.017 0.015 0.011 0.016 0.033 0.028 0.019 0.008 0.022 
Var  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Kurtosis  1.541 0.579 5.675 1.087 1.569 0.321 6.128 1.713 10.348 
Skewness  0.283 -0.608 0.762 -0.573 0.082 -0.049 1.516 0.409 2.130 
Min  -0.043 -0.042 -0.034 -0.052 -0.102 -0.067 -0.034 -0.022 -0.043 
Max  0.077 0.040 0.071 0.055 0.145 0.094 0.110 0.031 0.140 


















           
Mean 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.010 
Median 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.014 
Std. dev. 0.016 0.008 0.013 0.016 0.008 0.010 0.023 0.013 0.023 0.039 
Var 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 
Kurtosis 0.426 4.970 2.174 1.953 0.663 0.433 1.105 4.743 9.686 0.238 
Skewness -0.191 -0.173 0.432 0.849 -0.190 -0.256 0.491 -1.000 1.657 -0.418 
Min -0.037 -0.033 -0.028 -0.036 -0.019 -0.020 -0.058 -0.063 -0.052 -0.102 
Max 0.062 0.042 0.061 0.075 0.030 0.035 0.098 0.045 0.158 0.114 
Count 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 196 240 240 
This table exhibits the summary statistics of hedge fund strategies monthly returns over the sample period of 
January 1997 until December 2020 several financial crises omitted (1998, 2001, 2008, and 2020) from the time 
sample. The rows under hedge fund strategies represent the average monthly returns for each hedge fund strategy. 
The penultimate row displays the number of total months of comparison period concerning particular hedge fund 
strategies as reported by BarclayHedge.
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From table 12 we can perceive that during the comparison period from which all 
financial crises are excluded, the hedge fund indices only present positive returns. 
Surprisingly, the highest levels of mean are presented by Market returns (0.01 
monthly), Emerging Markets (0.01) and Equity Long bias hedge funds (0.009). The 
lowest average mean is experienced by the CTA hedge funds, which is consistent with 
the findings regarding CTA´s profound success during periods of financial crisis. The 
highest standard deviation of average returns is exhibited by Market returns, and 
lowest by the Market Neutral hedge funds. On the other hand, the highest amounts of 
kurtosis and skewness are experienced by the European Equities hedge funds. The 
lowest level of kurtosis is also experienced by Market returns, indicating that extreme 
returns on both ends have been lowest.  
Table 13 presents the annualized monthly returns calculated as equal-weighted during 
the comparison period from January 1997 to November 2020, excluding the months 
of financial crises. Obviously, these results are upward biased towards higher returns 
simply due to the fact that the months of financial crises are omitted from the data 
sample, in order to capture differentiated results than those gained when only 
observing the months of financial crises. The highest annualized average returns in 
this sample are presented by the hedge fund strategies “Others” in 1999 (+69.2%) 
while the lowest returns are experienced by Market- returns in 2001 (-21.1%). These 
results might be biased due to this year having fewer observable months after omitting 
the financial crisis periods. When entirely omitting the years 1998, 2001, 2008 and 
2020, the lowest returns (-13.7%) are experienced in 2011 by the Emerging Markets 
hedge fund strategies.
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Table 13. Hedge fund strategies and market return during the comparison period. 






































1997 0.223  0.157 0.173 0.266 0.227 0.261 0.164 0.268 0.246 0.145 0.177 0.196 0.140 0.172 0.109  0.063 0.312 
1998 0.066  0.054 0.076 -0.087 0.095 0.110 0.051 0.274 0.081 0.040 0.065 0.061 0.051 0.073 0.005  0.069 0.119 
1999 0.366  0.139 0.206 0.591 0.430 0.467 0.115 0.424 0.273 0.153 0.269 0.202 0.174 0.216 0.016  0.692 0.252 
2000 0.122  0.153 0.053 -0.043 0.037 0.164 0.126 0.207 0.121 0.118 0.102 0.119 0.193 0.217 0.066  0.106 -0.117 
2001 0.033  0.062 0.057 0.085 0.044 0.031 0.004 0.014 0.049 0.017 0.028 0.010 0.022 0.049 0.028  -0.021 -0.047 
2002 0.014  0.106 0.064 0.051 -0.055 -0.018 0.054 0.015 -0.028 0.071 0.018 0.071 -0.001 0.063 0.137 0.126 -0.079 -0.211 
2003 0.180  0.098 0.256 0.354 0.302 0.158 0.041 0.116 0.220 0.100 0.104 0.180 0.084 0.117 0.155 0.128 0.189 0.318 
2004 0.088  0.010 0.184 0.150 0.133 0.066 0.038 0.092 0.161 0.071 0.067 0.029 0.052 0.063 0.009 0.070 0.043 0.119 
2005 0.107  -0.032 0.079 0.221 0.123 0.115 0.062 0.141 0.082 0.047 0.069 0.094 0.054 0.064 0.028 0.096 0.067 0.061 
2006 0.124  0.117 0.147 0.219 0.147 0.080 0.047 0.134 0.156 0.061 0.094 0.078 0.140 0.139 0.056 0.123 0.070 0.154 
2007 0.097  0.041 0.080 0.215 0.102 0.076 0.040 0.070 0.085 -0.004 0.085 0.099 0.138 0.093 0.068 0.126 0.071 0.063 
2009 0.115 0.099 0.214 0.186 0.179 0.151 0.072 0.002 0.090 0.136 0.146 0.058 0.055 0.056 0.111 -0.008 0.045 0.073 0.224 
2010 0.109 0.074 0.122 0.140 0.123 0.142 0.073 0.036 0.069 0.100 0.117 0.049 0.067 0.061 0.108 0.064 0.088 0.111 0.175 
2011 -0.055 -0.088 0.001 -0.054 -0.137 -0.090 -0.046 0.002 -0.064 -0.037 0.045 -0.062 -0.037 0.038 -0.023 -0.042 0.050 -0.018 0.005 
2012 0.083 0.069 0.087 0.122 0.103 0.094 0.064 0.019 0.097 0.085 0.093 0.047 0.026 0.038 0.058 -0.018 0.049 0.064 0.163 
2013 0.111 0.109 0.081 0.168 0.026 0.214 0.139 0.086 0.131 0.108 0.087 0.088 0.048 0.039 0.096 0.008 0.016 0.159 0.352 
2014 0.029 0.047 0.012 0.008 -0.017 0.030 0.029 0.046 0.033 0.006 0.053 0.028 0.039 0.007 0.053 0.123 -0.026 0.067 0.117 
2015 0.000 -0.002 0.003 -0.101 -0.030 -0.011 0.025 0.052 0.052 -0.032 0.027 -0.001 0.023 0.080 0.011 -0.009 0.071 0.057 0.001 
2016 0.061 0.050 0.051 0.144 0.100 0.052 0.018 0.006 -0.041 0.116 0.056 -0.005 0.017 0.064 0.046 -0.044 0.005 0.014 0.135 
2017 0.103 0.076 0.026 0.042 0.186 0.140 0.083 0.029 0.083 0.081 0.040 0.060 0.040 0.050 0.059 -0.008 0.077 0.151 0.223 
2018 -0.052 -0.060 0.000 0.003 -0.109 -0.088 -0.030 -0.017 -0.031 -0.027 0.004 -0.048 -0.053 0.003 -0.049 -0.046 -0.040 -0.046 -0.051 
2019 0.088 0.107 0.077 0.025 0.088 0.135 0.046 -0.005 0.059 0.059 0.019 0.057 0.069 0.056 0.041 0.071 0.122 0.111 0.267 
                                        
This table presents equal-weighted annualized monthly returns of hedge fund strategies and the market during the comparison period from 1997 to 2020. 
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6.3.1 Alpha during comparison period 
Table 14 presents the monthly alphas of hedge fund strategies over market returns 
during the comparison period. The alpha estimates are calculated by utilizing an 
augmented version of the CAPM, as explained in equation 9, in which the alphas 
represent the difference between alpha values in several crisis periods and normal 
market conditions. Hence, if a hedge fund strategy obtains positive alpha values in 
table 14, it represents the overall outperformance during this time period. In addition, 
if these crisis alpha p-values are not statistically significant (p-value < 0.05), it 
indicates that even though alpha might be positive during the comparison period, it is 
not statistically significant.  
The results from table 14 indicate that almost all hedge fund alphas are positive and 
statistically significant on a 0.95 confidence level, except for the Balanced (Stocks & 
Bonds) funds. However, due to several hedge funds related biases, on some extent 
these results might be faulty. The highest monthly return over market (alpha) during 
the comparison period is generated by the hedge funds following the European 
Equities investing strategies, while the worst positive excess returns are generated by 
CTA and Market Neutral Hedge fund strategies. These results are consistent with the 
ones measured during financial crises, as these funds presented the most positive 
characteristics of returns then as well. 
Table 14. Hedge fund alpha of monthly returns during comparison period. 























          
Alpha 0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.005 
P-value 0.000 0.405 0.000 0.000 0.079 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 



















          
Alpha 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.003 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.313 0.001 0.020 
                    
 This table presents the average monthly alphas of different hedge fund strategies during the combined comparison 
period. Alpha is calculated by utilizing an augmented version of CAPM as defined in equation 9. 
92 
6.3.2 Beta coefficient and correlation during comparison period 
Table 15 indicates that hedge funds reach neutral results against market returns during 
the comparison period. These measurements are obtained by using the augmented 
version of CAPM, as explained in equation 9. As the months of financial crises are 
omitted from this dataset, these factors measure the relationship of hedge fund 
strategies against market returns during normal and bullish market conditions. Beta 
values established from this section represent the sensitiveness of hedge-fund strategy 
returns against market returns and P-value displays results as to whether they are 
statistically significant at a 0.95 confidence level (P-value < 0.05).  
According to table 15, all hedge fund strategies except for CTAs have statistically 
significant Beta values at a 0.95 confidence level. The CTA- hedge funds actually hold 
the lowest value for Beta coefficient (0.011) and it is not significantly different from 
zero (P-value = 0.766) statistically, meaning that this strategy is especially neutral to 
market returns during the comparison period. When omitting CTA hedge funds from 
this sample, the lowest Beta value is displayed by Market Neutral hedge funds, which 
is consistent with the description regarding the investment practices of this hedge fund. 
On the other hand, the hedge fund strategy following Equity Long Bias investment 
practices has the Beta coefficient of (0.631), indicating that this strategy is very 
sensitive to the movements experienced by market returns.  
Table 15. Hedge funds Beta during comparison period. 




















          
Beta 0.350 0.343 0.116 0.244 0.556 0.631 0.336 0.058 0.292 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 



















          
Beta 0.307 0.076 0.219 0.218 0.081 0.138 0.011 0.119 0.392 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.766 0.000 0.000 
                    This table presents the coefficient beta and p-value of beta hedge fund strategies during the combined comparison 
period included in the time sample between 1997 and 2020. These measures are obtained by using the augmented 
version of CAPM, as described in equation 9. 
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When comparing the results presented in table 15 with the ones shown in table number 
10, we can notice that several funds such as Equity Long/Short, Market Neutral, Global 
Macro and CTA funds present higher beta value estimates during comparison period. 
This would indicate that these funds are not highly correlated with market returns. 
Table 16 displays the correlation-coefficient between the different hedge fund 
strategies and the market returns during the combined comparison periods between 
1997 and 2020. The P-value of correlation measures whether the results are 
statistically significant at a 0.95 confidence level. All the strategies except for the CTA 
hedge funds present statistically significant P-values with a 0.95 confidence level. The 
uppermost level of correlation is indicated by Equity Long Bias- hedge fund indices 
(0.89), as it is similar during financial crisis periods, as displayed in table 10. 
Significant correlation is also indicated by many other hedge fund strategies, including 
Balanced, the entire Barclay Hedge Fund Index, Event Driven and Equity Long/Short 
hedge funds. A negative correlation (-0.085) is again exhibited by CTA hedge funds 
with statistically insignificant p-values, indicating a true neutrality of this strategy 
against market returns. When omitting CTA strategies, Market Neutral hedge funds 
obtain the second to lowest level of correlation, which is consistent with the findings 
presented in table 15 regarding Beta-values. 
Table 16. Correlation during comparison period 




















          
Correlation 0.803 0.843 0.408 0.591 0.663 0.887 0.707 0.287 0.522 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 



















          
Correlation 0.743 0.374 0.664 0.535 0.393 0.563 0.017 0.330 0.658 
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.792 0.000 0.000 
                    
This table presents the correlation and p-value of correlation between market returns and hedge fund strategies 
amongst comparison period between 1997 and 2020. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
One particularly attractive reason for considering investing in hedge funds is their 
described ability to obtain different levels and types of risks through various exposures 
to distinct markets companied with unlike betas and alphas. Hence, one of the main 
attractions of hedge funds is their feature of low vulnerability towards market risk. The 
financial crisis of 2008 showed the markets that hedge funds might not include so little 
market risk as it is perceived. According to Billio et al. (2010), all hedge fund strategies 
performed dreadfully during the crisis of 2008. The objective of this thesis was to 
evaluate whether hedge funds are in fact vulnerable to overall market risks and 
conditions, as often is denied within the definition of hedge funds. Additionally, 
different hedge funds’ ability to give protection in the eyes of market neutrality is 
examined through several financial crises and comparison periods.  
The main results of the performance analysis during the overall time period between 
1997 and 2020 indicate that all hedge fund strategies except for “Balanced” were able 
to generate statistically significant and positive alpha when compared to market 
returns. However, during financial crisis periods, only a few hedge fund strategies 
were able to generate excess returns (alpha) when compared with the alpha during 
tranquil periods. Surprisingly, hedge fund strategies such as Distressed securities and 
Fixed Income arbitrage that were supposed to give protection against falling market 
conditions according to their definitions, resulted in the most significant losses during 
financial crises. Moreover, statistically significant alfas were also mainly negative. 
These results would imply the reality that hedge funds are not able to give adequate 
shelter during the times of financial crises. 
Based on the performance analysis of hedge funds neutrality against market returns, 
we can conclude that beta coefficients of hedge funds are quite low during bullish 
market periods but start to increase as soon as the market conditions begin 
deteriorating. These findings also revealed some exceptions since CTA hedge funds 
produced negative beta and Global Macro along with Market Neutral hedge funds 
displayed diminishing values in betas during several financial crises. When analysing 
the correlation of hedge fund strategies and market returns, all funds except for CTA´s 
and Market Neutral hedge funds displayed higher correlation during financial crises 
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than during tranquil market periods. This would imply that hedge funds in general are 
not able to give proper protection against market conditions during financial crises and 
might even result in lower returns than presented by the market returns. These results 
were also supported by the findings presented by Adj. R2 factors as a majority of hedge 
fund strategies had lower R-squared values during overall time periods rather than 
during financial crises. Similar findings are also presented by similar previous studies 
such as according to Billio et al. (2010), the correlation of hedge fund strategies against 
market returns increases substantially during times of financial crises and market 
turmoil. Given that hedge funds generally performed comparatively inadequately 
during several financial crises, is the title and description of hedged funds even 
justified and appropriate? 
As previously mentioned, hedge fund-related data is heavily prone towards several 
biases due to hedge funds' voluntary reporting practices. Even when attempting to 
control for common biases such as backfilling bias and survivorship bias, as in this 
study, biases still affect the authenticity of results gained from examining hedge funds' 
prior returns characteristics. In addition, despite the reality that CAPM regression is 
simple to apply when examining the relationship between risks and expected returns, 
often the real empirical results obtained through CAPM can be considered as rather 
weak (Fama & French, 2004). However, the length of data-sample employed is 
generous as it includes a diverse variety of different market conditions while the time-
frequency of one month is relatively short, supporting the analysis of hedge funds 
returns movements against market returns more accurately. Additionally, this study 
includes the examination of various distinctive hedge fund strategical allocations 
giving a comprehensive perspective about hedge funds' performance against 
observable market returns. As a suggestion for possible future research, the method 
for investigating hedge funds returns could be altered in a manner that would further 
assess the true essence of hedge funds problems, as the payoffs and risks are often 
unlike and hedge funds voluntary reporting provokes various issues. Such models are 
presented by Fung and Hsieh (2004) in which an APT-like model is used to define 
hedge fund returns with dynamic risk factors. The 7-ABS (asset-based style) factor 
model in question, is directly observable using market prices, hence it could provide a 
good benchmarking framework for identifying different biases along with returns and 
risks concerning hedge funds. 
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